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Should the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
be read to shelter religiously motivated conduct from otherwise
valid, generally applicable laws? There is general agreement,
both on the Supreme Court and among commentators, that
laws aimed a t religion-laws
intentionally singling out a
practice,
or
religion
in
general, for a burden or
religious
prohibition-are
presumptively invalid under the First
Amendment.' But what of laws which are not designed to
affect religion; laws with recognized, legitimate governmental
purposes which have the added consequence of impinging upon,
burdening, or prohibiting religious conduct? Four examples
from well-known cases illustrate the issue.
First, consider Mrs. Frances Quaring, a Nebraska
housewife who believed that the Second Commandment
prohibited her from having her photograph taken or from
carrying or using photographs ("graven images" from her
perspective). The State of Nebraska, however, required that
applicants for a driver's license have their photographs taken
and affixed to the license and prohibited driving without a
valid driver's license. Thus, by state law Mrs. Quaring was
denied that primary instrument of freedom and mobility in
modem America-use
of the automobile-because
of her
religious beliefs. Should we understand the Constitution's
guaranty of freedom of religion as protecting Mrs. Quaring's
mobility?2
Next, consider the situations in which activities of specific
religions have been criminally sanctioned. The Amish are
bound by a religious command to "live separate and apart"

1. Curiously, under modern doctrine it is the Establishment Clause which has
been held to prohibit gover~lental action which intentionally or explicitly
discriminates against religion or which discriminates among religions. See Larson v.
Valente, 456 US. 228 (1982); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636-42 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
15-16 (1947). With the decision this term in the Santeria animal sacrifice case,
the Court has held that the Free Exercise Clause also prohibits laws which
discriminate against religious conduct. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City
of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
2.
When the Supreme Court considered this case, it was unable to answer
that question. The Eighth Circuit held that the state must issue Mrs. Quaring a
license without a photo. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), afd
by equally divided Court sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 US. 478 (1985) (per
curiam, Powell, J., did not participate).
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from mainstream society. They understand this a s a command
from God which requires that their children be raised "separate
and apart." In turn, to the extent formal education is allowable
at all, it must take place in small local schools and may not go
beyond the eighth grade. Most states, however, have
promulgated laws mandating universal education of all
children up to the tenth grade. These laws were not targeted at
the Amish, but they render criminal the religiously mandated
conduct of the A m i ~ h . ~
At one time in the history of the Mormon Church,
polygamy was a religious duty for those members able to
practice it. However, being married to more than one wife at a
time was also the traditional crime of big am^.^ For many
American Indians, the use of peyote is the central act in the
religious practice of the Native American Church. However, in
many states, use of peyote (along with many other powerful
hallucinogenic drugs) is criminal under generally applicable,
formally neutral laws.5 Except in the case of the Mormons, the
government did not intentionally discriminate against or
3.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Amish parents who refused to
send their fourteen- and fifteen-year-old children to school after the eighth grade
were convicted of violating the state's compulsory school attendance law. The
Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause sheltered the Amish from
criminal prosecution for this conduct. The Court has also held, to the contrary,
that the Clause does not shelter the Amish in their belief that the mandate to live
"separate and apart" requires that they neither contribute to nor receive benefits
, from the Social Security system. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). Yoder
is examined at some length in Stephen Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond:
Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 309, 333-45
[hereinafter Pepper, Alternutives]; and I have discussed Lee in Stephen Pepper, The
Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflections on Recent Cases, 9
N. KY. L. REV. 265, 299-302 (1982) [hereinafter Pepper, Conundrum]. These cases
are also considered briefly infia part 1I.D.
4.
In the initial Supreme Court case dealing with the Free Exercise Clause,
the bigamy conviction of a Mormon was upheld. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878). The opinion is described briefly infia part ED.,and examined in some
detail in Pepper, AZternutives, supra note 3, at 317-26.
Although neutral in form, the legislation enforced in Reynolds may in fact have
been targeted specifically at the Mormons. Orma Linford, The Mormons and the
Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 UTAHL. REV. 308, 314-19 (1964). If so, it would now
be considered presumptively invalid, and would be factually somewhat similar to
the Hialeah case. See supra note 1.
Sacramental usage of peyote by members of the Native American Church
5.
was held unprotected by the First Amendment in Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Supreme Court's opinion is examined at length in
Douglas Laycock, T h Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael
W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109 (1990).
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burden these groups in their religious conduct; yet their
members faced criminal conviction for following the tenets of
their religion.
In these situations religiously motivated conduct is either
penalized or prohibited by laws which are not aimed at
religion. Although the law in each case is religiously neutral in
form and intent, religious believers may be burdened by the
law's mandate in a way quite different from that law's effect on
the rest of society. Should such situations be governed by a
constitutional paradigm of equality, or a paradigm of liberty?
William Marshall, a friend and a colleague in this symposium,
argues that equality is the proper paradigm, and that formal
equality, rather than substantive equality, should regulate.'
According to this view, it is unfair-and
contrary t o the
underlying logic of the First Amendment-to prefer religion as
a basis for action over other beliefs that ground one's conduct.
If the First Amendment prevents criminalization of the conduct
only if it has a religious motivation, but allows governmentally
imposed punishment or burden if the same conduct is
otherwise motivated, religion has been preferred over other
bases for action; and such a result is not constitutionally
acceptable.
The wrong or unfair aspect of this unequal treatment may
be trivial in some instances and substantial in others. Aside
from religious reasons such as Frances Quaring's, it is hard to
imagine substantial prejudice or harm in being required t o
have a photo on one's driver's license. It simply is not much of
a burden. Peyote usage is usually a rather unpleasant and
-cult
experience. Although there are certainly some who
wish t o try it on the basis of non-religious reasons, either as a
result of intellectual interest o r a sense of adventure, the
burden of being prohibited from doing so does not seem great.
6.
William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1989-90) [hereinafter Marshall,
The Case Against the Compelled Exemption]; William P. Marshall, Solving the Free
Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Free Expression, 67 MINN.L. REV. 545 (1983)
[hereinafber Marshall, Free Exercise as Free Expression]; see also Ellis West, The
E
J.L. ETHICS &
Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 N ~ R DAME
PUB. PoL'Y 591 (1990). A notion of substantive, as opposed to formal, equality may
well lead to results quite different than those suggested by Marshall and West. See
infia part IVA.
Professor Marshall's contribution to this symposium discusses a different
problem, although from a related perspective. William P. Marshall, The Inequality
of Anti-establishment, 1993 B.Y.U.L. REV. 63.
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On the other hand, there are many people with substantial,
strongly held, non-religious reasons for wanting to educate
their children away from public or governmentally regulated
schools. To allow only those with religious reasons to avoid the
compulsory attendance law is a burden of a different order
from the first two examples. Similarly, there are many with
strong reasons for wanting a form of marriage not sanctioned
by the state. Homosexual couples with long term marriage-like
relationships are one example. To allow those with sincere
religious reasons to avoid the laws concerning marriage while
they remain applicable to all others appears to be a substantial
wrong.
The First Amendment contains a guaranty of the "free
exercise" of religion.' Is religion singled out in the Amendment
for special treatment or for equal treatment? Is freedom for the
religious dissenter the essential purpose of the Free Exercise
Clause, or is it equality between those acting upon religious
motives and those acting upon other bases? In elaborating an
answer to these questions, the discussion in Part I1 will
canvass the major categories of constitutional discourse as
bases for interpreting the Free Exercise Clause and provide a
response to some of the related arguments of Professor
Marshall. Parts I11 and IV will then turn to the basic
interpretive choice presented by the issue of religiously based
exemptions from neutral law, and to a few of the difficulties
that must be faced in developing a vigorous free exercise
doctrine based upon religious liberty.
11. BASESFOR CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Constitutional interpretation occurs, for the most part,
through argument which can be divided into five major
categories: (1) text, (2) history, (3) structure and theory, (4)
doctrine and precedent, and (5) prudence, social policy and
j u s t i ~ e . ~These categories are interrelated, lack clear
boundaries, and can each be subdivided into narrower aspects.
The fifth category, in particular, is hard to define, capacious,
and capable of being divided into numerous subcategories.
These categories do provide, however, a useful path for analysis
7.
U.S. CON^. amend. I.
8.
PHILIPBOBBITT,
C O N ~ I O N FATE,
A L 3-119 (1982); Richard H.Fallon, Jr.,
A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 mxJ.
L.
REV.1189, 1189-209 (1987).
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of the meaning of a constitutional provision.

A. Text
The words of the First Amendment clearly single out religion for both a benefit and a burden. "Congress shall make no
law respecting a n establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. . . ."g On its face, the language grants a
unique advantage to religious conduct, protecting it from governmental imposition; and imposes a unique disadvantage,
preventing the government from supporting it. To understand
this as a provision which puts religion on a n equal footing with
other bases for action seems to be a curious reading. There are
no "free exercise" or "establishment" provisions for science,
sports, philosophy or family relations. The language itself thus
seems to answer whether we have a paradigm of equality or of
liberty; the language of the Free Exercise Clause is clearly in
the form of a grant of liberty.''
It must also be noted that this grant of liberty is in language as absolute as that found anywhere in the Constitution.
Other provisions in the Bill of Rights contain moderating qualifiers: "unreasonable searches and seizures,"" c'excessiue
bail,"12 "cruel and unusual p~nishments,"'~"due process of
law."'* The words of the Free Exercise Clause, by contrast,
seem pure and inclusive: no law prohibiting the free exercise of
religion.'' Only the protections of speech and press are as ab9.
U.S. CONST.amend. I.
10. Laycock, supra note 5, at 13-14.
11. U.S. CONST.amend. IV (emphasis added).
12. Id. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. Id. amends. V & XIV (emphasis added).
15. One could, of course, focus on words other than those emphasized. See
Pepper, AZtenatives, supra note 3, at 353 11.195. For example, "prohibit" is a different usage than "abridge," which is the usage applied to other First Amendment
freedoms. Does this mean that government can impinge on religious conduct short
of outright prohibition, while it cannot even abridge speech and press? Government
could prohibit Jews or Catholics from voting or holding office, or tax them at a
higher rate, under such a view. But those seem exactly the kind of abuses that
the framers intended to prevent, and I know of no scholar or court which has
seriously suggested such a wooden reading. Or one could focus on "Congress" as
the only governmental entity limited by the Amendment, thus leaving all other
governmental actors free to impbge on religious conduct as they see fit. But the
federal government ads, for the most part, through delegation of congressional
authority. (Thus,the IRS would clearly be covered.) And there has been no inclination that I know of to interpret the First Amendment differentidy in its application to the judiciary and executive, as the "Congress" usage might suggest. More-
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solute in terminology.
Speech and press are inherently limited in their impact,
however, because they are a particular, limited species of conduct. They refer to communication only, and as such their consequences are inherently limited: they have a n impact directly
only on other human minds; they can cause no direct injuries
because further consequences must be mediated through the
recipient of the communication. "Exercise," to the contrary,
denotes action in general, and "religion" is not limited in its
ordinary understanding to communicative acts. "Exercise of
religion" covers religiously mandated smuggling and shelter of
aliens (the "sanctuary" movement), smuggling of slaves from
slave states to free (the underground railroad), human sacrifice, the sacramental drinking of wine, refusal to send one's
children to public school, and so ,on. Neither "religion" nor "exercise" provides the kind of inherent limits that come with
"speech" and "press." This distinction is demonstrated within
the First Amendment itself. Assembly . . . "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances" is included in First
Amendment protection,16 and it is communication. But unlike
speech and press, "assembly" is not inherently limited, and
thus the First Amendment protection is limited in its terms to
"peaceabl[ey assembly only." No similar modifier appears i n
regard to exercise of religion, thus making this freedom the
most absolute in its terminology of any in the Constitution.
Perhaps the absence of a modifier is a n accident and without meaning. But the framers had more limited models at
hand, which they did not choose. An examination of language
available to, but not chosen by, the framers crosses into an
area of both history and text. During the same period when it
was drafting the First Amendment, Congress adopted the 1787
Ordinance for the Government of the Northwest Territory,
providing that: "No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable

over, the other nine amendments in the Bill of Rights do not share this usage,
suggesting it had no limiting meaning. The religion clauses certainly were not
intended to apply to the states, but the application of the Bill of Rights to the
AND
states is a large and complex issue. See, e.g., MARKD. HOWE,THE GARDEN
THE WILDERNESS
19-23 (1965); WILBERG. KATZ, RELIGION
AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS 8-10 (1964). Suffice it to note that if the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights are held applicable to the states, there is no reason not to also apply the
Free Exercise Clause.
16. U.S. CONST.amend. I.
17.
Id.
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and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his
mode of worship, or religious sentiments, in the said territory."18 Similarly, Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom, introduced in Virginia in 1779, passed in 1785, and
well known by the framers of the First Amendment, provided:
[Nlo man. . . shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on
account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men
shall be fiee to profess, and by argument to maintain their
opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no
wise diminish, enlarge, or effect their civil capacities.lg

The absoluteness of the language of the Free Exercise Clause,
so different from both of these then-available models concerning freedom of religion and from the phrasing of other civil
liberties in the Constitution, is consistent with an earlier articulation of James Madison in a seminal document of American
religious freedom, his A Memorial and Remonstrance: 'We
maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no mans [sic]
right is abridged by the institution of .Civil Society, and that
Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance."20Significantly,
Madison drafted the original version of the First Amendment
and was the moving force in Congress behind its passage.21

B. History
The history surrounding the religion clauses is a large
subject, and one much written about. Most of that writing has
tended to focus upon the Establishment Clause," although it
18.
1 ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH
AND STATEI N THE UNITEDSTATES480 (1950)
(emphasis added).
19. Id. (emphasis added).
JAMES
MADISON, A MEMORIALAND REMONSTRANCE
(1785), reprinted in
20.
JAMES
MADISONO N RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY
55, 56 (Robert S. AUey ed., 1985).
21.
THE FIRST LIBERTY120-21 (1986); STOKES, supra note
W
I L. MILLER,
~
18, at 339-50, 538-48. It is worth noting that Madison used the phrase "free exercise of Religion" as early as 1776 in his suggested language for the Virginia Declaration of Rights, Hunt, James Madison and Religious Liberty, Am. Hist. A. AM.
Rep. for the Year 1901 at 166-67 (1902), and that he used the same language from
the Declaration in his 1785 Remonstrance.
A notable recent exception is Michael W. McCo~ell,The Origins and His22.
torical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990),
which provides a thorough examination of the subject. What follows in this brief
section addressing the history of the clauses is in accord with the evidence presented by Professor McCo~ell,and is consistent with his account, although it was
first written prior to publication of his work. See supra note *.
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is the same history behind both clauses. Because it is a legal
document we are attempting to interpret, history as it relates
t o the intentions and meaning of those who framed and adopted the First Amendment is surely relevant. Because it is a
constitution we are interpreting, a document intended to be
lasting and therefore at least somewhat elastic and vague, that
relevant history may well not be determinative. Here, &er a
few preliminary observations, I will elaborate on three aspects
of the historical background which are helpful in contemporary
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and point toward the
conclusion that the relatively absolute language of the Free
Exercise Clause may not have been an accident.
As I have suggested elsewhere, the clearest, least controversial, narrow understanding of the original purpose of the
religion clauses is to see them as aimed at two different aspects
of the perceived evil of government affiliation with religion.23
The Establishment Clause was aimed at prohibiting federal
government support for one or several sects through affirmative
provisions such as subsidies or declarations of dogma. The Free
Exercise Clause was aimed at prohibiting support for one or
several favored sects through negative provisions aimed a t
other disfavored sects such as limitation of the franchise, imprisonment, or banishment. Certain provisions of religious
"establishments" with which the colonists were familiar could
be categorized under either heading; for example, legally mandated church attendance. It is accurate t o characterize this
intention as both "disestablishment" and as "separation of
church and state."24
Moving beyond this narrow understanding to resolve contemporary issues on the basis of history is very diffcult because those who supported this "disestablishment" and "separation of church and state" did so for very different motives.25
There were at least three significant streams of thought coming
together to support adoption of the religion clauses, two of
which will be discussed further below. The Enlightenmentdeist-rationalist view perceived separation primarily as protect-

23. See Pepper, Altenatives, supra note 3, at 313.
24.
'Disestablishment" is somewhat inappropriate because there was no federal
establishment to begin with. "Separation of church and state" is somewhat inappropriate because it has a potential meaning far larger than the narrow meaning
given above.
Pepper, &ternatives, supra note 3, at 311-17.
25.
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ing the state-this new experimental federal governmenefrom
the likely disruptive and possibly destructive influence of organized religion. The radical protestant view, to the contrary, saw
separation as protection for the church from the profane and
corrupt influence of the state. In number, these two streams
were far from a majority of those supporting separation, but
they had influence far beyond those numbers. The Enlightenment-deist-rationalist stream, exemplified by Jefferson and
Madison, was prominently represented among the educated
elite and was the preeminent influence in constructing the
theory and drafting the text of the Constitution. It is thus no
accident, although it is certainly surprising, that the Constitution is a so thoroughly secular document, with but three passing references to anythmg religious. The radical protestants, on
the other hand, were the "outs," whose church was not established both because they were the minority and because they
believed in separation as a religious principle. To a significant
extent and particularly in Virginia, they provided the political
steam t o power the movement for disestablishment and separatioaZ6
The third and probably largest stream of thought perceived
the religion clauses of the First Amendment as a federalism
provision. These were the "ins." Content with the religious
establishments that were currently the status quo in their
home states, disinclined to a contest with other religions over
support from the new federal government, and somewhat .anxious about who might win if the federal government were allowed to support and inhibit religion in the way the colonial
governments had in the recent past, this group supported the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses as limits on the federal government only, leaving the states free in the realm of
church and state." Given the vast growth in federal government, this view would leave substantial coverage for the k e e
Exercise Clause: the Bob Jones casez8involved federal law as
use of
did recent cases concerning social security numbers:'

26.
RICHARD
E. MORGAN,THE SUPREMECOURT AND RELIGION4-26 (1972);
supra note 21, at 120-21.
HOWE,supra note 15, at 1-31; MILLER,
27. See HOWE,supra note 15, at 19-23; KATZ, supra note 15, at 8-10.
28.
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); see i@a discussion
accompanying notes 84-87.
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
29.
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national forest lands:'
and yarmulkes in the military.31 But
most cases concern state law, such as Nebraska's driver's license rules and Oregon's criminal law concerning usage of
peyote, and here the clauses would not apply.
The federalism view has become an anachronism. Over the
last hundred years the Supreme Court has incorporated most
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights generally, and the First
Amendment in particular, into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and applied them to the states. Whether or not this was justified in terms of the intentions and purposes of those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, a very
large and controversial topic, it is now quite clearly the law of
the Constitution-a de facto binding constitutional amendment.
Thus the still relevant historical purposes and meanings are
primarily those of the Enlightenment-deist-rationalistview and
the radical protestant view. Before turning to these perspectives, however, some basic historical context is useful.
I . Simple history
It is important to remember that the notion of a secular
government was a new and relatively untried idea at the time
of the American revolution. The relation between church and
state was not a marginal problem for the colonists as it is for
us. Civil strife over issues of religion and state was a more o r
less constant problem in the historical background of the colonists who were engaged in creating new independent states
and a new federal government when the religion clauses were
adopted. Not far in the past was a history of armed conflict and
bloodshed over issues of religion and state. The long-term background was the Reformation and the several hundred years of
armed European conflict over state affiliation with one religion
or another. The more recent history for most was the less
bloody English background of constant strife and suspicion:
first, the break from Roman Catholicism under Henry VIII;
next, the attendant fear of both external and internal Catholicism; and finally, the Anglican-Puritan conflict. Many of the
colonies had been created by groups seeking shelter from these
conflicts and the burdens of practicing a religion disapproved
by the state. And because the alliance of church and state was

30.
31.

Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.439 (1988).
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).

18 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I993

the only available model, that alliance, and its attendant strife,
was then replicated i n the colonies. These were not distant
problems. In 1774 Madison wrote to a friend about "five or six
well-meaning men i n close jail [in the adjacent county] for
publishing their religious sentiments, which in the main are
very or tho do^.'"^
Being put in jail for your relatively "orthodox" religious
opinions can make you rather angry-probably fighting angry.
That, and far worse, was the reality of the history of the alliances between church and state for those who were drafting
and adopting the First Amendment; that was the patrimony
and the dilemma facing those who were creating a new government. As a matter of historical fact the alliance of church and
state meant trouble. I t was that problem, well-known and general, that the framers of the First Amendment were trying to
ameliorate with their experiment in the separation of church
and state. Part I1.E. considers more directly what that suggests
for contemporary interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.

2. The Enlightenment-deist-rationalist view
Consistent with the clearest narrow understanding of the
historical intention of the religion clauses noted above, it is
common now to assert that both clauses had a single primary
purpose: freedom of religion.33 The free exercise provision directly protected that freedom while the non-establishment
provision was perceived as the primary necessary instrumental
provision to assure it indirectly. While there is probably some
truth to this assertion, it leaves out a major concern of those
approaching the issue fiom the Enlightenment perspective.
From that approach, the alliance of church and state threatens
good government in general, not just in relation to freedom of
religion." From this perspective, the lesson of history was
that the alliance tends toward absolutism in government and
toward political division and strife over religious issues. Freedom in general (limited government) and freedom of inquiry in
particular were crucial to progress and good government. A
church formally c o ~ e c t e dto the state was seen as likely to be
hostile to such freedom. In this view, organized religion is per32.
LEOPFEFFER, CHURCH,STATE,AND FREEDOM
91 (rev. ed. 1967).
33.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE
H. TRIBE,AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1160-61,
1201-04 (2d ed. 1988).
MORGAN,
supra note 26, at 16-18.
34.
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ceived as backward and threatening. It is impossible to read
Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Re1igious Freedom or Madison's
A Memorial and Remonstrance, for example, without noticing
this perspective. Madison, in one of many examples from the
Remonstrance:
What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had
on Civil Society? In some instances they have been seen to
erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of the Civil authority;
in many instances they have been seen upholding the thrones
of political tyranny: in no instance have they been seen the
guardians of the liberties of the people.35

This view is an inversion of the commonly stated one above
that both clauses have freedom of religion as their primary
purpose. Here, to the contrary, the Establishment Clause is
seen as crucial to good government, its purpose is good government in general;36and the Free Exercise Clause is a necessary
instrument to support the primary Establishment Clause goal
of separating the churches from the government. From this
perspective freedom of religion also may have been seen as a
significant good in itself, but that was of secondary importance. 37
35.

36.

MADISON,
supra note 20, at 58.
This understanding of the Clause continues to have substantial vitality.

The mixing of government and religion can be a threat to free government, even if no one is forced to participate. When the government puts
its imprimatur on a particular religion, it conveys a message of exclusion
to all those who do not adhere to the favored beliefs. A government cannot be premised on the belief that all persons are created equal when it
asserts that God prefers some. Only "[alnguish [sic], hardship and bitter
strife" result "when zealous religious groups struggl[e] with one another to
obtain the Government's stamp of approval." Such a struggle can "strain
a political system to the breaking point."
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2665-66 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962) and Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 694 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (citations & footnote omitted)).
37.
Steven Smith denominates this the "civil peace rationale" for religious freedom and acknowledges that it "probably influenced the founding generation." Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 163-66 (1991). He argues, however, that to consider it the
"primary rationale" is probably "anachronistic," pointing out that even Jefferson
and Madison relied substantially on other reasons. Both Smith and McComell have
concluded that the radical protestant view, to be discussed infra, was more common and influential. Id.; McCo~ell,supra note 22. This is probably true, but
Smith probably deemphasizes the Enlightenment view too much. Particularly in
light of the general prevalence of a religious point of view, documented by Smith
and McConnell among many others, the Constitution's lack of reference to God and
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There is a sub-element of this view which should be mentioned briefly here, and will be returned to later. Enlightenment thought is rational, skeptical and scientific. It is both a
symptom and a cause of secularization. The American Constitution, a strikingly secular document, is clearly the product of
this thought. The Establishment Clause makes sense in this
scheme as a guarantor of secular government. But the Free
Exercise Clause is harder to understand. I have suggested in
previous writing that the Free Exercise Clause may well represent the compromise that those supporting the relatively new
secular world view were willing to make with the preexisting,
and hitherto dominant, religious world view.38 The bounds of
that compromise do not of themselves appear from the language of the clauses or this history. And had the issue been
addressed directly, there would probably not have been agreement even among those working from the Enlightenment
view,39 not to mention between those who shared this view
and those who remained firmly attached to a religious view.
This notion of a compromise between those of the Enlightenment-deist-rationalist view and those with a strong and widely
held religious view makes more sensible the surprisingly absolute language of the Free Exercise Clause and may suggest
that real power was contemplated for the Clause even by those
primarily in the Enlightenment stream of thought. In this
regard there is some striking social contract imagery used by
Madison that will be quoted in the Structure and Theory section below.

3. The radical protestant view
The radical protestant view shared with the Enlightenment view a firm belief in separating church and state, but the

religion, see infra note 42, is both surprising and significant. And Jefferson and
Madison, who resonated with and articulated the Enlightenment view quite clearly,
were pivotal and influential adors in the history of religious liberty and the construction of the First Amendment. Each will be discussed briefly as the discussion
proceeds below. As to Madison, see supra note 21; MADISON,
supm note 20; and
Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV.
299, 301-03 [hereinafter Pepper, Taking]; see also supra part 1I.C. As to Jefferson,
see Pepper, Alternatiues, supra note 3, at 319-20, and sources cited therein.
See Pepper, ALternatiues, supra note 3, at 378; Pepper, Taking, supm note
38.
37, at 304-06.
A clear difference between Jefferson and Madison will be mentioned at the
39.
beginning of the Doctrine and Precedent discussion, infra part 1I.D.
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motive was quite different: it was the church which was threatened by and needed to be removed from the state, not the state
which needed protection. And religion needed protection from
the state's support as well as its potential hostility; official
governmental support was a corruption to the purity of the
church. Thus from the believer's side it is the Free Exercise
Clause which is of most importance-a guaranty that the
church will not be interfered with by government-and the
Establishment Clause takes on the more instrumental role.
Roger Williams was the initial and eloquent proponent of separation as a necessity for religion, and his image of the "garden"
of religion needing protection from the "wilderness" of the secular world, including the state, is e~emplary.~'
The community
apart, the chosen, the need for separation from the errant
world, is a recurrent and strong theme in protestantism. Creation of a community of truth requires shelter from the larger
community, including its perhaps well-intentioned laws. A
direct line runs from this understanding to the situation of the
Amish, who refuse to send their children to public school or to
participate in the social security system, and to Mrs. Quaring.
The intervening centuries change the perspective of the insular
religious community little, but they add a pervasiveness of law
(public schools, driver's licenses, a voluminous ubiquitous tax
code) that makes separation of garden from wilderness a far
more daunting task.
In his foreword on the Bob Jones case, Robert Cover made
a n observation which exemplifies this view and which resonates with the compromise that the Enlightenment understanding may have been making with the adoption of the Free
Exercise Clause:
There is a powerful, almost physical image a t work in the
conception to which the Amish and Mennonites implicitly
appeal in their constitutional confession. The image is one of
a dedicated, sacred space, a refuge carved out from the general secular, legal space of the state. Within the dedicated nomic refuge, there is an accommodation to a religious rule of
recognition expressed in Acts 529-"We ought to obey God
rather than men"-instead of submission to the principle,
embodied in article VI, section 2 of the Constitution, that
"[tlhis Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme
40.

See generally HOWE,supra note 15, at 1-31.
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Law of the land

C. Structure and Theory
As noted above, the Constitution is a remarkably secular
document creating a secular government." The Establishment
Clause appears thoroughly consistent with that document in
that it attempts to assure that the secular government remains
secular. The Free Exercise Clause, to the contrary, contains a
remarkably absolute protection for religious conduct dacult to
square, on its face, with the rest of the Constitution. From the
radical protestant perspective, of course, this absolute protection is perfectly sensible: the government is left free to be what
the government wants to be, but space must be left for the
church to be what it must be. The Free Exercise Clause creates
that space. From the Enlightenment side the apparent capaciousness of that space is more difficult to explain. James Madison, using the imagery of the social contract, may supply the
answer. He defines religion as "the duty which we owe to our
Creator and the manner of discharging it,"'3 and then asserts:
This duty is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of
obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can
be considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governour of the Universe: And if
a member of Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate
Association, must always do it with a reservation of his duty
to the General Authority; much more must every man who
becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a
saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.44

Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term--Foreword: Nomos and
41.
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 30 (1983).
42.
The text of the Constitution has only three references to religion; two are
oblique and the third excludes religion from political relevance:
(1) the clause exempting Sundays as days to be counted in determining
the period of time within which the President must exercise his veto; (2)
the dating of the document as "in the year of our Lord one thousand
seven hundred and eighty seven," and (3) the crucial clause of Article VI
[proscribing] religious tests for office.
MORGAN,
supra note 26, at 20.
supra note 20, at 56 (quoting VA. DECLARATION
OF RIGHTSart.
43.
MADISON,
XVI (1776)).
44.
Id.
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This passage proceeds to the conclusion quoted above45that
religion is "wholly exempt" from the rule of government, a
conclusion consistent with the absolute language of the Free
Exercise Clause.
The procedural nature of the Constitution as a whole is
congruent with this view of religion as a subject set aside from
the general jurisdiction of government. The Constitution creates structures and processes for making binding communal
decisions; that is, it creates governmental mechanisms for making and implementing law.46 The Constitution does not announce ultimate truths and it does not create mechanisms for
discovering or announcing ultimate truths. (Note that it is the
Declaration of Independence that announces 'We hold these
The Constitution has other
truths t o be self-evident . . .
business at hand.) Ultimate truths or reality are left in the
non-governmental sphere; they are for individuals or groups t o
discover. Truth as seen by the individual or group may form
the basis for their actions within the processes of government? it may provide the motive for law making and application; but truth is neither the object nor the result of governmental processes.
This view of the Constitution provides an integral understanding of the First Amendment under which at least one of
its purposes is to keep ultimate truth, and the mechanisms for
finding it, outside of the sphere of government control. The
connection between the freedoms of speech and press and the
truth are well articulated in constitutional law. The place of
religion beside them in the First Amendment is understandable: in the view of the believer it represents ultimate truth,
the ground from which all else proceeds. The Establishment
Clause prevents ultimate truth (or those who believe they know
it) from impinging too directly upon both government and those
who may not share that understanding of the truth. The Free
45.

See supra text accompanying note 20.
The almost exclusively process oriented nature of the Constitution is one of
(1980). The choice
the primary points of John H. Ely's DEMOCRACYAND DISTRUST
among processes of course involves substance. See Paul Brest, The Substance of
L.J. 131 (1981).
Process, 42 OHIO STATE
47.
THE DECLARATIONOF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (US. 1776).
See generally Frederick M . Gedicks, Some Political Implications of Religious
48.
Belief, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL? 419 (1990); Frederick M. Gedicks
& Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy and Values: Some Thoughts on Religion
and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAI,. L. REV. 1579 (1987).
46.
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Exercise Clause prevents the government from impinging upon
the ultimate truth of the belie~er.~'
From a different structural perspective, the religion clauses
are prominent as one of very few provisions in the Constitution
which clearly support mediating institutions. Religion, as understood both by the framers and contemporary observers, is
primarily a group phenomenon; it is very diEcult to read the
clauses without perceiving an intention to create a space apart
for religion, and therefore for religious institution^.^' The
clauses are "liberal" in the sense of focusing upon liberty and
restraining government, but they are more "civic republican"
and communitarian i n their support for one of the primary
intermediate institution^.^^ The Free Exercise Clause may
well be the only explicit support for non-governmental community in the C o n ~ t i t u t i o n ,and
~ ~ this is of major significance.
We have here no image of the "self-constituted" individual, no
"liberalism" of lonely, isolated individualism." Rather we
have a space, a liberty, for groups and for individuals. And
given the prominence of the radical protestant vision, there is
reason to think of the group as constituting the individuals to
as significant an extent as the individuals constituting the
group*
Thus we have three different but complementary theoretical perspectives on the Free Exercise Clause. It can be seen as
a Lockean social contract provision protecting liberty and re-

49.
See generally Nomi M. Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out":
Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 581 (1993). The right to assemble to petition for redress of grievances is the
.one First Amendment right that does not fit easily into this understanding.
50.
"The religion clauses of the Constitution seem to me unique in the clarity
with which they presuppose a collective, norm-generating community whose status
as a community and whose relationship with the individuals subject to its norms
are entitled to constitutional recognition and protection." Cover, supra note 41, at
32 n.94. See Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99; Michael W. Mcconnell, Accommodation
of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 17-19.
51.
See Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN.L. REV. 701, 729, BLUE (1988); McConnell,
38 (1986), reprinted in MARK TUSHNET, RED, W ~ E AND
supm note 50, at 19-21.
52.
Freedom of association must be implied from other explicit constitutional
provisions. See infm note 54 and accompanying text. Federalism may be the other
explicit support for community, but that is governmental community.
53.
For a critique of modern liberalism, a i d by implication much modern conAND THE
stitutional law and interpretation, see MICHAELJ. SANDEL,LIBERALISM
LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(1982). For a critique of the critique, see C. Edwin Baker,
Sandel on Rawls, 133 U. PA. L. REV.895 (1985).
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straining government by carving out an area free from governmental impingement. This demarcated area of freedom of religion can also be seen as part of a more general exclusion of
ultimate truth from the control of the government based upon
the larger structure of the Constitution as an almost exclusively procedural document and upon the First Amendment as a
whole. And, finally, the restraint upon government articulated
by the Free Exercise Clause supports the mediating structure
of the church (or other religious groups) as a locus for activity
and meaning beyond governmental interference.
The second and third theoretical views are more complementary than may first appear. To the extent one sees the
Constitution as a procedural document which fences government out of decisions about ultimate truth through its structure, purpose, and through the First Amendment as a whole,
space for intermediate institutions is created; and, given the
social nature of persons and of their intellectual and spiritual
endeavors, this is a necessary space if the limit on government
is t o have any significant effect. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Supreme Court has implied from the First Amendment as a whole a right of "freedom of association" not found in
the text.54 The structure and theoretical values drive toward
such a conclusion. And it is significant that with the Free Exercise Clause there is no need for such implication; the "right of
association" is there quite explicit.
Before moving on, it should be noted that there is a structural view of the First Amendment and the role of the religion
clauses within it that is quite different from the one sketched
above. This view focuses on the content of the entire Amendment. Speech, press and assembly to petition for redress of
grievances all involve communication, including in the latter
case a gathering together for communication. Much religious
activity is communicative in nature. As noted above, one key
function of religion may be the determination and affirmation
of ultimate truth. And prototypical religious conduct is probably worship: a gathering together for conduct which is primarily communicative. Noscitur a sociisf a maxim of statutory

54.
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981);
JOHNE. NOWAK
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW $ 16.41 (3d ed. 1986); NAACP v.
Alabama a rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984); TRIBE, supm note 33, at $$ 12-26 & 14-16.
"It is known from its associates. The meaning of a word is or may be
55.
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construction, suggests determining the meaning of a word from
accompanying words. Religion thus interpreted with the accompanying language of the First Amendment could be read to be
limited to the kinds of conduct otherwise covered by the
Amendment: communication and association for the purpose of
communication, with the symbolic speech conduct typical of
worship being the only conduct explicitly added by reference to
religion.56 Leaving the Establishment Clause aside, the First
Amendment becomes a functional whole under this interpretation. I n the process, however, the protection for religious conduct aside from worship disappears, and the Free Exercise
Clause becomes nothing more than a n explicitly mentioned
instance of freedom of speech and press.
Such a view is consistent with the Enlightenment-deistrationalist perspective described above, and from this direction,
a paradigm of equality for religious bases of belief with others
makes some sense. As Justice Jackson articulated the position:
"It was to assure religious teaching as much freedom as secular
discussion, rather than to assure it greater license, that led to
its separate ~tatement."~'But this perspective leaves out the
radical protestant view, which may well have been dominantf and is difficult to reconcile with a text which is
phrased as an absolute grant of freedom of religion.

D. Doctrine and Precedent
Thomas Jefferson appears to have preferred a view of religious freedom congruent with this last understanding of the
First Amendment, a view which protects religious opinion and
expression but nothing more." The operative language of his
Virginia Bill for Religious Freedom was restricted to "opinion,
belief, profession and argument."60 Beyond this, the government could act: "[Ilt is time enough for the rightful purposes of

known from the accompanying words." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1060 (6th .ed.
1990).
56.
Marshall, Free Exercise as Free Expression, supra note 6, at 545; Pepper,
Alternatives, supra note 3, at 367-68.
57.
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result).
McConnell, supra note 22; Smith, supra note 37.
58.
David Little, Thomas Jefferson's Rdtgious Views and Their Inf2uence on the
59.
Supreme Court's Interpretation of the First Amendment, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 57,
58-64 (1976).
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
60.
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civil government for its offieers to interfere when principles
break out into overt acts against peace and good order."' The
operative language of the Free Exercise Clause is not limited to
speech and opinion, however, and Madison, who was intimately
involved in the drafting, as Jefferson was not, had a rather
different view of when government could act to restrict religious conduct. His suggested language for the 1776 Virginia
Declaration of Rights not only used "free exercise" as the operative language, but further stated that "no man or class of men
ought on account of religion be subject to any penalties or disabilities, unless under color of religion the preservation of
equal liberty, and the existence of the State be manifestly endangered."62 Jefferson's view is where the Supreme Court
started with its first interpretation of the clause. One hundred
years later the announced doctrine of the Court was more congruent with Madison. Then, in an abrupt turnaround in 1990,
the Court returned to the Jeffersonian understanding.
Reynolds v. United States" is that first Jefferson-based
interpretation, and it is worth a brief detour as an example of
the historical, textual, and structural concerns we have considered. The persecution of and violence aimed at the Mormons is
a useful reminder of the "simple history" mentioned above and
of the concern that history generated for the framers: religious
dserences tend t o beget violence and bloodshed. Quite literally
in search of space in which to live out their religious convictions, the Mormons vacated civilization and moved to the great
western desert to create their Zion in the wilderness. George
Reynolds, following his religious duty as a Mormon, was married to more than one woman. Under federal law, this bigamy
was a crime, but the First Amendment protected the "free exercise" of religion. From the radical protestant perspective, the
polygamy of the Mormons is the garden, and the state's criminal law is an intrusion from the wilderness. If the religion
clauses protect the church, the criminal law must not intrude.
But from the Enlightenment perspective of protecting the state
from the incursion of religion, the criminal law is a primary
mechanism of government that ought to be protected from
intrusive religious claims. If the Free Exercise Clause is the
Enlightenment's compromise, George Reynolds presents the
61.
62.
63.

STOKES,
supm note 18.
Hunt, supra note 21, at 166-67.
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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question of the bounds of that compromise: How extensive is
the sheltering space?
We know that Jefferson's view confines freedom of religion
to opinion and belief, but George Reynolds actually married a
second wife; he did not just believe in polygamy. This is conduct clearly beyond worship, or any cluster of communicative
activities otherwise protected under the First Amendment. On
its face, polygamy does not appear to be conduct which threatens "equal liberty" or the "existence of the State," but that may
well have been arguable.64 The Court had no need to struggle
with the absolute language of the clause, or with Madison's
relatively absolute notions ("wholly exempt"), however, because
the Justices simply relied on Jefferson for the proposition that
freedom of religion protected belief only and not action.
From this rather constricted initial interpretation, the
Court retreated, but very slowly. In the 1940 opinion deciding
Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court announced that the Free
Exercise Clause was not limited to protection of belief, it also
protected "freedom to act," although to a significantly lesser
degree. Freedom to believe was "absolute," but action could be
regulated "for the protection of society" as long as government
did not "unduly infringe the protected freedom.'s5 Cantwell
was one of a long series of Jehovah's Witnesses cases in which
the Supreme Court announced a great deal of First Amendment law, but did not clearly distinguish the parameters of free
speech from freedom of religiod6 For the most part, there
was little need to do so because the conduct of the Witnesses
was almost exclusively communicative-classic speech, press
and assembly activity such as street corner proselytization
through direct conversation, the playing of records, and the
The opinion does rely in part on the assertion that polygamy leads to "sta64.
tionary despotism." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. Justice Souter's concurring opinion
in the Hialeah case asserts that Reynolds remains valid on this basis, meeting the
Sherbert-Yoder test described below. 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2245-47 (1993). The Reynolds
opinion is complex and interesting and I have analyzed it elsewhere at some
length. See Pepper, Altemtives, supra note 3, at 317-26.
310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). Cantwell is also significant as the opinion in
65.
which the Court clarifies that the Free Exercise Clause is applicable as a limit on
governmental action by the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Clause has been "incorporated" into the Fourteenth
Amendment so as to apply against the states.
See, e.g., Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Martin v. City
66.
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938). See also Pepper, Altemtives, supra note 3, at 326-30.
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distribution of handbills. Free speech and press doctrine was
sufficient to reach decisions concerning this kind of conduct.
For this reason, and probably others as well, throughout this
extensive span of precedent it was never clear that the Free
Exercise Clause protected anything beyond the kinds of nonreligious conduct protected by the speech, press and assembly
clauses. It was thus unclear whether the Free Exercise Clause
had any contemporary effect o r had, instead, become only a
vestigial anachroni~m.~'
With Sherbert v. Vernerss in 1963 and Wisconsin v.
Yoders9in 1972 the Supreme Court clarified that the Free Exercise Clause did have an ambit of its own well beyond that of
other First Amendment freedoms. In doing so it articulated a
doctrine and a test which seems much closer t o the Madisonian
vision of free exercise quoted above than to the Jeffersonian
understanding relied on by the Reynolds court. In Sherbert,
Adell Sherbert lost her job, and was unable to find another,
because of her refusal to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. She
was denied unemployment compensation benefits on the basis
of having refused to accept "suitable work." In Yoder, Amish
parents refused on the basis of religious belief to send their
children to school for the final two years of compulsory education (ninth and tenth grades). The parents were convicted of a
crime for violating the mandatory school-attendance law. In
both cases the Supreme Court held that application of the law
at issue to the religious conduct at issue was an impingement
on freedom of religion prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause.
The test announced and the language used suggested
sweeping protection for religious conduct. In Sherbert the Court
said that even an "incidental burden on the free exercise of
appellant's religion may be justified [only] by a 'compelling
state interest.' "'O Later in the opinion the Court put the matter more emphatically: "[Iln this highly sensitive constitutional

67.
Under modern doctrine, governmental action intentionally or explicitly discriminating against religion is prohibited by the Establishment Clause, as is such
conduct discriminating among religions. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15, concurring);
16 (1947); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636-42 (1978) ( B r e ~ a nJ.,
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). Including religion with race as a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause also has the effect of rendering
most such governmental conduct unconstitutional. See supra note 1.
68.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
69.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
70.
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area, '[olnly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.' "?' Similarly,
the Yoder court stated the test as follows: "The essence of all
that has been said and written on the subject is that only those
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religi~n."?~
Much has been written about the Court's free exercise
opinions in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases and during the era
when Sherbert and Yoder were the rule. This article will not
attempt to cover that ground again, although it is interesting
and w~rthwhile.'~Rather, the following paragraphs briefly
summarize the doctrine created in the Sherbert and Yoder
opinions and the remarkable inconsistency with which that
doctrine was applied by the Court.
The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine had five main component^.'^
First, action was protected-conduct beyond speech, press, or
worship was included in the shelter of freedom of religion.
Neither Sherbert's refusal to work on the Sabbath nor the
Amish parents' refusal to let their children attend ninth and
tenth grades can be classified as conduct protected by the other
clauses of the First Amendment. Second, indirect impositions
on religious conduct, such as the denial of twenty-six weeks of
unemployment insurance benefits t o Adell Sherbert, as well as
direct restraints, such as the criminal prohibition at issue in
Third, as the language quoted above
Yoder, were pr~hibited.'~
71.
Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
72.
406 US. at 215.
73.
See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 33, a t 1154-301; Jesse H. Choper, The Free
Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and a n Appraisal of Recent Developments,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943 (1986); George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.863 (1988); Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The
Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989)
[hereinafter Lupu, Where Rights Begin]; Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and
Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391
(1987); Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6; Marshall, Free Exercise as Free Expression, supra note 6; Pepper, Taking, supra note
37; Pepper, Alternutives, supm note 3. The multitude of sources cited in this material will lead the reader into the literature on the subject.
See Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at 308-12.
74.
This is frequently called the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and stands
75.
for the proposition that a government cannot accomplish indirectly, through denial
or conditioning of benefits, that which it is constitutionally prohibited from doing
directly. Sherbert is a primary precedent in this line of cases which recently has
become rather complex. It is a crucial doctrine for cases like Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 US. 574 (1983) (non-profit status) and Quaring v. Peterson, 728
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indicates, the protection granted was extensive. Only extremely
strong governmental interests justified impingement on religious conduct, as the absolute language of the text of the Free
Exercise Clause suggests.
Fourth, the strong language was backed by a requirement
that the government provide proof of the important interest a t
stake and of the danger to that interest presented by the religious conduct at issue. Fifth, in determining the injury t o the
government's interest, a court was required t o focus on the
effect that exempting religious claimants fkom the regulation
would have, rather than on the value of the regulation in general. Thus, injury to governmental interest had to be measured
at the margin: assuming the law still applied to all others,
what would be the effect of exempting the religious claimant in
this case and other similarly situated religious claimants in the
future?76Together, the fourth and fifth elements required that
facts, rather than speculation, had to be presented concerning
how the government's interests would be harmed by excepting
religious conduct from the law being challenged.
Sherbert and Yoder adopted a balancing test for free exercise jurisprudence, and balancing tests are notoriously manipulable.77Exaggeration of the weight on the governmental interest side of the balance is particularly likely through speculation
about the effects of decisions adverse t o those interests and
through defining those interests at a higher level of generality
than the constitutional interests on the other side of the balan aunt took
ance. For example, in Prince v. Massachu~etts~~
her niece proselytizing on the peaceful evening streets of
Brockton. Sarah Prince, the aunt, was convicted of violating
child labor laws. Despite the fad that none of the evils ordiF.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), afd by equally divided Court sub nom. Jensen v.
Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (per curium, Powell, J., did not participate) (driver's
license), where what is at issue is in the form of a government "benefit." In
Sherbert the Court stated: "[Tlo condition the availability of benefits upon this
appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effedively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties." 374 U.S. at 406.
This fifth element is simply an application of the more general principle
76.
frequently referred to as the Yeast drastic means" analysis. This is usually presented as an inquiry into whether the government can reach its goal or serve its
interest through means which do not impinge-or which impinge significantly
less--on the constitutional right at issue. In this f&h element of the SherbertYoder doctrine, the "less drastic means" is exempting religious claimants from an
otherwise valid legal regulation.
See Pepper, Alternutives, supra note 3, at 341-44, and sources cited there.
77.
78.
321 U.S. 158 (1944). .
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narily associated with child labor were present in the case, the
Supreme Court placed on the state interest side of the balance
"the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that
children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth" and the "crippling effects of child employment,
more especially in public place^."'^ The Court did not similarly inflate the other side of the balance.
The effect of the fourth and fifth elements of the SherbertYoder doctrine was to impose a discipline which helps prevent
this kind of manipulation. In Sherbert the Court would not
accept, without proof, speculation about the effect of possible
future fraudulent religious claims on the compensation fund.80
The government's interest in compulsory education is clearly
"compelling," and ranks "at the very apex" of state f~nctions.~'
But i n Yoder the Court refused to put this general interest on
the balance, and instead focused upon the state's marginal
interest in compulsory education of Amish children after the
eighth grade, a matter of quite different weight. Exempting
Amish children from required attendance for the ninth and
tenth grades has relatively little effect on the state's generally
compelling interest in public education."
The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine was not applied consistently
by the Supreme Court. Mrs. Quaring's case appeared to be a n
easy one under the doctrine because exempting the very few
persons who would object to having photos on their driver's
licenses would seem likely to have very little, if any, deleterious effects on the interests of the state. (New York did not
require photos on licenses until just a few years before the
Quaring case, and Nebraska itself had several exceptions such
as learner's permits.) Nonetheless, the United States Supreme
Court split four to four, and because opinions are not issued in
cases of tie votes, no explanation was given.83
The situation presented in Bob Jones University was far
. ~ ~ university engaged in race discrimination
more d i f f i ~ u l tThe
mandated by religious belief. Because of this conduct, the Inter-

79.
Id. at 168 (citations omitted).
80.
374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
81.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213.
82. Id. at 221-29.
83. See Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), afd by equally
diviokd Court sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (per curiam,
Powell, J., did not participate).
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 US. 574 (1983).
84.
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nal Revenue Service revoked its tax exempt status, a major
blow to a contemporary non-profit educational institution. The
case was problematic because the effect of an exemption from
race discrimination prohibitions in education based upon religious convictions is hard to gauge. There is some evidence that
fraudulent claims to such beliefs might be the result in some
areas given the resistance to integrated education. But unlike
the Yoder opinion where the Court carefully analyzed and
weighed the interests on both sides, in Bob Jones it dealt with
the constitutional question in three brief paragraphs. The
Court cited both Sherbert and Yoder as the appropriate precedents (among others), and repeated the kind of sweeping protection enunciated in those cases: in order t o "justify a limitation on religious liberty," the state must show "that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental intere~t."'~It
proceeded to recognize the "compelling" nature of the
government's general interest "in eradicating racial discrimination in education."86 The fourth and fifth elements of the
Sherbert-Yoder doctrine then disappeared, however, as the
Court simply asserted that there were "no less restrictive
means . . . available to achieve the governmental interest," but
did not discuss why exemption was not an acceptable less drastic means in Bob Jones when it was in Yoder, or what effect
such an exemption would have on the governmental intere~t.'~
In Unites States v. Lee,s8 a case dealing with the Amish
mandate to live "separate and apart" in regard t o social security taxes rather than education, the Court recited the tests from
Sherbert and Yoder, and then seemed not t o apply them in
reaching the conclusion that the religious conduct was not
protected. Instead of narrowing the government interest, the
Court inflated it in a way reminiscent of the Prince de~ision.~'
In the case of Bowen v. Roy," however, sincere religious objection to obtaining a social security number was held protected.
Even though a social security number was a statutory requirement for receiving federal welfare benefits, exemption from

85.
Id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982)).
86.
Id.
87.
Id. at 604 (citations omitted). See Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for
Racially Discriminatory Schools, 60 Tnr. L. REV. 259 (1982).
88.
455 U.S. 252 (1982).
Id. at 259-62. For a brief discussion of Lee, see Pepper, Conundrum, supra
89.
note 3, at 299-302.
90.
476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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that requirement was mandated by the C ~ u r t . ~Justice
'
O'Connor wrote a ringing endorsement of the Sherbert-Yoder
doctrine in a separate opinion in Roy in 1986," but in 1988
she wrote an opinion for the Court finding the doctrine entirely
inapplicable to sincere religious objections by American Indians
to planned construction of an access road through national
forest land which included their most sacred sites.93
In sum, the Court articulated the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine
with some consistency, but only rarely applied it. Then, in a
case in which the validity of the doctrine was neither questioned nor argued, the Court abruptly and surprisingly denied
that it had ever existed, and appears to have returned to a
reading of the clause similar to that used in Reynolds. Justice
Scalia authored the opinion for a five member majority. Asserting that the Court had "never held that an individual's religious beliefs excused him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate,"
the opinion held that usage of peyote as a genuine, central religious practice of the Native American Church was not sheltered from criminal prosecution by the Free Exercise Cla~se.'~
There is some disagreement as to the holding in Bowen resulting from five
91.
opinions. A close reading of the opinions reveals that five justices followed the
Sherbert-Yoder doctrine finding it unconstitutional to require the father to provide
a social security number for his daughter as a condition for his receiving welfare
benefits. See Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at 319-22. This understanding of the
opinions in the case appears to be c o n h e d in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140-42 (1987); but see the concurring opinions of Justices
Powell and Stevens, id. at 146-48.
92.
476 U.S. at 724 (O'Co~or,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93.
See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988), discussed in Lupu, Where Rights Begin, supra note 73. See also Pepper,
Conundrum, supm note 3, at 281, for a brief discussion of the determinative issue
in Lyng. Justice O'Connor also wrote an elaborate dissent in Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 528 (1986), a case dealing with the uniform requirements of the military conflicting with the wearing of a yarmulke by an orthodox
Jew. The Court held against the religious claimant in that case and in O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), a case dealing with a free exercise claim
by a prison inmate. In both cases, I would suggest that the holdings result more
directly from a wariness of the Court concerning the relation between the Bill of
Rights and total institutions in general, than from a rejection of the Sherbert-Yoder
doctrine. See Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at 322-23, and cases cited supra note
109.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990). Justice O ' C o ~ o r
94.
authored a concurrence arguing that the compelling interest test (what I have
called the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine) was clearly the ruling and accepted interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, but concluding that the government had met its
burden of showing a compelling interest. Id. at 891. Justice Blackmun, with whom
Justices B r e ~ a nand Marshall joined, dissented, agreeing with Justice O'Comor
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In so ruling, the Court reached out t o decide an issue not presented. The facts dealt with unemployment compensation, not
criminal prosecution. And the Oregon Supreme Court had ruled
that the criminality of the conduct was (1) irrelevant t o the
award or denial of unemployment compensation in Oregon and
(2) hypothetical and hence irrelevant in the absence of a criminal pr~ceeding.'~
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court was
remarkable for several reasons: (1)its lack of candor regarding
the prior twenty-five years of precedent under the SherbertYoder doctrine, (2) its refusal to honor the Oregon Supreme
Court's interpretation of its own law concerning the irrelevance
of uncharged criminal conduct to the award of unemployment
compensation, and (3) its reaching out to undo a doctrine not
put at issue in the briefs or oral argument and to decide an
issue not genuinely before it. The opinion has been subject to
well-deserved, sharp and extensive criticism, and efforts have
been made to map out what content the opinion may have left
for the Free Exercise Clause.96 I shall not attempt to tread
through that thicket here.
It should be noted, however, that there are several factors
which suggest that the doctrine announced in Smith might be
short-lived. First, Justice O'Connor, who agreed with the result
in Smith but authored a sharp and powerful concurrence asserting the continued vitality and justice of the Sherbert-Yoder
doctrine, has emerged over the last two terms as one of the
leaders of the new, independent minded, centrist block on the
Court, including herself and Justices Kennedy and Souter.
Second, Justice Souter, who was appointed to the Court after
the Smith decision to replace Justice Brennan, wrote a separate concurrence in the recent Hialeah decision expressing his
disagreement with and criticizing the Smith ruling, indicating
his understanding that the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine remains
good law in conflict with Smith, and suggesting reasons why
the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude reconsideration
of the Smith rule." This was particularly significant because

that the compelling interest test was the correct doctrine, but finding that, under
the fads, the government had not shown such an interest. Id. at 907.
95. See Smith v. Employment Div. 11, 763 P.2d 146, 147 & n.3, 148 (Or. 1988);
Smith v. Employment Div. I, 721 P.2d 445 (Or. 1986).
Excellent analysis of the case and what may be left of free exercise doc96.
trine can be found in Laycock, supra note 5, and McCo~ell,supra note 5.
97.
Church of the Lukurni Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,
2241-50 (1993).
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Justice Souter agreed with the unanimous result in Hialeah
and was not on the Court which considered Smith: the only
purpose of the concurrence was t o put on the record his disagreement with a recent prior ruling, a rather unusual act for
a relatively new Justice, and one clearly intended to signal
lawyers and lower court judges that Smith might not be reliable precedent. Third, Justice White, one of the five votes supporting Justice Scalia's revision of the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause, has resigned from the Court. Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, nominated t o succeed him, is likely t o be more inclined toward a liberty-oriented understanding of religious
freedom, although there appears to be little indication on the
record of her inclinations in this regard.g8(On the other hand,
Justice Kennedy, the third member of the influential central
group, joined the Smith decision and authored the Hialeah
majority decision which relied explicitly upon Smith. This
would make it more dacult for him to change his position and
join Justices O'Connor and Souter in a return to something like
the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine. And Justice Thomas, who replaced
Justice Marshall, joined in all but one portion of Justice
K e ~ e d y ' sHialeah decision.ggThus, the Court appears t o re-

98.
Judge Ginsburg dissented from the denial of a rehearing en banc in the
free exercise case of Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 739 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir.
1984), writing a brief opinion supportive of freedom of religion where the issue was
the wearing of a yarmulke contrary to military regulations concerning the uniform.
(Interestingly, then Judge Scalia, the author of Smith, joined her opinion.) The
case was later decided by the Supreme Court against Doctor Goldman, the free
exercise claimant. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). The Supreme
Court's determination is best understood as part of a long line of decisions limiting
first amendment freedoms in the special, limited rights contexts of the military
and prisons. See Pepper, Taking, supra note 37 at 322-23.
Judge Ginsburg has also authored two opinions applying the Sherbert-Yoder
doctrine; one ruling in favor of a free exercise claimant; the other ruling against
the claimant, finding a compelling governmental interest to support application of
the law at issue. Leahy v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(overturning a summary judgment for the District, returning the case to the trial
court, noting that "the District has not demonstrated that requiring a religious
objector to provide his social security number in order to obtain a driver's license
is the least restrictive means of achieving the concededly vital public safety objective at stake," id. at 1049, see notes 2, 83, 144, and accompanying text); Olsen v.
Drug Enforcement Administration, 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding denial
of free exercise protection for the use of marijuana; the fads of the case provide
an interesting comparison with Smith, supra note 94). Judge Ginsburg also joined
in the opinion in Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 0.C. Cir. 1983), a controversy
concerning Native American objection to development of federal land, analogous to
the Lyng case, supra note 93.
113 S. Ct. at 2221.
99.
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main in ap uneasy five to four division on whether Smith or
Sherbert-Yoder is the correct understanding of the Free Exercise Clause.loO)Fourth and finally, on May 24, 1993, the
House of Representatives passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which would reinstate the "compelling state
interest" standard and is intended to undo the Smith decision.
There appears to be substantial support in the Senate as
well.lol
Thus, the doctrinal interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause began by adopting Jefferson's Enlightenment-oriented
view and ignoring the quite different view of Madison and the
radical protestants. This was an understanding compatible
with an equality based paradigm. Over the fifty-year period
beginning with Cantwell in 1940, however, the Court developed
(but did not consistently follow) a well articulated doctrine
aligned more with the Madisonian and radical protestant understanding-a doctrine clearly reflecting an understanding of
the clause as mapping out an area of liberty and freedom from
government impingement. With Smith, a five member majority
turned away from the liberty paradigm-seemingly, although
not clearly, turning back to an equal treatment modello2-and left free exercise doctrine in an undeveloped, unclear state. And now, with the resignation of one of those five,
and with Justice Souter's declaration of disagreement, future
interpretation of the clause is both open to substantial change
and difficult to predict.

100. Justices Scalia, K e ~ e d y ,Thomas, Stevens and Chief Justice Rehnquist
support the Smith rule; Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Blackmun (and possibly
future Justice Ginsburg) support the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine.
101. For a discussion of the Act, see Douglas Laycock's article in this symposium. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L.
REV.221.
102. This term's opinion in the Hialeah case confirmed this understanding.
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court relied upon Smith for "the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justiiied by
a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice," and overturned the Hialeah laws because
they were neither formally neutral nor generally applicable. 113 S. Ct. at 2222.
And Justice Blackmun in concurrence stated Smith was "wrongly decided, because
it ignored the value of religious freedom as an affirmative individual liberty and
treated the Free Exercise Clause as no more than an antidiscrimination principle."
Id. at 2250.

38 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNrVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11993

E. Values, Policy and Prudence:
The "Why" of the Free Exercise Clause
Why religion? The First Amendment singles out religion
for both a special benefit-the guaranty of "free exerci~e'~-and
a special detriment-the prohibition on "establishment." No
other aspect of life is similarly singled out in the Constitution,
not science, education, art, philosophy, family relations, or
agriculture. Commentators have begun to ask about the Free
Exercise Clause: Why should there be a special freedom for
religious conduct?103When I first heard that question put at
an academic conference on the religion clauses, I thought the
answer, at least in constitutional terms, was obvious. But perhaps it is not nearly so obvious as I had thought. How else can
one explain the contrast between the absolute language of the
clause and the Supreme Court's stingy interpretation? How
else can one explain cases like Quaring and Smith? There is a
strong current of equality in American values, and equality is
particularly identified with the Constitution. It thus goes
against our grain t o grant religious believers legal preference
(such as exemption from valid legal regulations) that others do
not receive. And so the grain is often followed despite a constitutional pointer in the other direction which could hardly be
clearer.
Why religion? The answer, t o a large and meaningful extent, is obvious. That answer is: text and history. Both, I submit, are remarkably clear. And when those primary sources of
constitutional interpretation are clear, that alone is an important reason. The "simple history" discussed briefly above provides a rather succinct explanation of why the framers saw
religion as sufficiently different to carve out two explicit constitutional provisions concerning it. Their history taught them
that religion meant trouble, serious blood-spilling trouble, when
it was mixed with government.
Their purpose was to try t o ensure civil peace in regard to
religious questions. Their solution was to try to separate government and religion, and the recognition that the separation
had t o go both ways: religion could not interfere with the mech-

103. See, e.g., John H . Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty,
18 CONN. L. REV.779 (1986);Michael E. Smith, !Z%e Special Place of Religion in
the Constitution, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 83.
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anisms of the state, but the mechanisms of the state must not
interfere with the garden of the church. From Hobbes and
Locke through Jefferson and Madison there was lasting concern and thought, on the Enlightenment side, about achieving
civil peace in regard to religion.lOl And this was mirrored, albeit t o a lesser extent, on the radical protestant side with concern that religion not become enmeshed in the profane business
of the state. The church must leave the state alone, and the
state must leave the church alone.
(The "why" in historical terms is clear; it is the "how" that
is difficult. The directive in the First Amendment is clear
enough; it is carrying it out which is so difficult.'" Religion
and state cannot be kept separate for each deals with everyday
life in the real world, as the cases from Reynolds through
Quaring and Bob Jones demonstrate. Keeping the civil peace in
light of the explosiveness of religious beliefs is a clear reason,
and reason enough, for the religion clauses. That the elaboration of the directive through precedent and doctrine is difficult
is not a warrant to ignore the clear message of the text and its
historical context.)
The nature of religion explains both this explosiveness and
the fact that it does not fit comfortably within the processes of
a democratic polity. Religious beliefs tend t o be (1) strongly
held; (2) of special significance t o the believer, often relating t o
his or her basic identity and understanding of both self and the
reality beyond self; and (3) beyond verification or testing by
rational discourse or other decision making or knowledge gathering processes such as voting or scientific investigation. Majority rule does not fit well with those kinds of beliefs; compromise does not fit a great deal better; and imposition by legal
authority from above on such beliefs is not likely to be taken
with equanimity. Religion is differentieven singular (what
else compares?)lo6-and that singularity is perfectly congruent with both the text and history of the Free Exercise Clause.

104. ROGERS M. SMITH,LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALLAW 19
(1985). But cf. Smith, supra note 37.
105. The practical difficulties, although asserted summarily more than seriously
examined, were a major part of Justice Scalia's justifcation for the abandonment of
the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine in the Smith opinion. See 494 U.S.at 882-90.
106. John Garvey compares it to insanity. Garvey, supra note 103, at 798. Although I think that comparison is not particularly apt, it is suggestive of the dominant secular view of our age and of how far we have travelled from the 1787
understandings.
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That singularity is also consistent with a constitutional decision to treat religion differently, t o give it substantial shelter
from decisions reached through majoritarian democratic processes, substantial shelter from otherwise valid law. (Given the
singular nature of religion, the clarity of the text, and the coherence of the historical background, what may be difficult to
understand is the disinclination to grant the shelter. The answer is the strong pull of equality mentioned above, the difficulty in framing a doctrine with workable limits [no freedom
can be absolute], and other factors mentioned below.)
The discussion so far in this section explains the special
place of religion in the polity for the most part on the basis of
the threat religion poses to civil peace, a negative cast attributable primarily to the Enlightenment view. But the singularity
of religion contains a promise-a positive cast-as well which
also supports its place in the First Amendment and generous
exemptions for believers. That promise, for at least some believers, is a life lived in a dimension beyond the ordinary, a life
with connections and obligations different in kind from the
physical and social world we all share; a promise of life lived in
accordance with
transcendent truth and with a profound
connection t o that truth. Those who have an intimation of that
promise, who live at least part of their lives with such connections, tend t o give it an importance, a valuation, an allegiance,
above all others. It tends to give a meaning to life that those of
us without profound connection to that dimension do not share.
That meaning, that connection, is often perceived, by both
believer and unbeliever, as good. It is perceived as making life
better. If she had a choice (and sometimes choice is involved)
the believer would choose that life over one without the transcendent connection. And many who do not believe would also
choose that life if they could.
The threat and the promise arise from the same phenomenon: religious experience. The strength and profundity and
higher allegiance of religion threaten the peace of the state; but
they also promise a life of a different and better kind for the
believer. Why would the state want to impinge on that life if it
could avoid it? The believer suffers a terrible choice; the state
puts itself at risk. What is to be gained by putting the believer
to a test of allegiances?
There are two simple answers. First, the state gains whatever the object is of the law or regulation which is impinging
on the believer: all the ubiquitous purposes of common action
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through government. Is that gain worth the loss and the risk? I
submit that it is usually not. The Free Exercise Clause seems
to be a determination on the constitutional level that it is not.
The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine, with its identification of "overriding" and "compelling" governmental interests as the necessary
ground for limiting free exercise and with its search for 'less
drastic means" (which do not impinge on believers) to reach
those interests, appeared to rest on that same conclusion.
Moreover, under that doctrine most of the purposes of governmental action could still be reached: application of the Free
Exercise Clause created an exemption for the believer; the law
remained valid for all others,lO' and thus remained generally
effective.lo'
Second, the state gains equality in the application of its
law, a central value, a constitutional value. But the factors
discussed above suggest that religion is different in a significant way: the person whose religious life is invaded by a legal
provision is not similarly situated to the person for whom the
provision has no such effect. The impact of the legal provision
on those differently situated persons is not equal. Also, the risk
to the state in enforcing the law is not equal. Thus there is
good reason for unequal application of the law, and it is a constitutionally sufficient reason under the Equal Protection
Clause. (This leaves aside for the moment the fact that this
particular inequality is based upon the explicit text of the Constitution-the Free Exercise Clause.)
There is another value to religion, another reason for treating it differently. The added dimension of a religious life includes not only a profound connection to the truth, but also
characteristically a profound connection t o the community defmed by allegiance t o that truth.logThus, part of the promise
of religion is transcendent meaning in the communal life as
well as the individual life. Many find in our current law, including constitutional law, an overemphasis on individualism

107. Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S.
Constitution, 18 CONN.L. REV.739, 761-78 (1986).
108. If the exemption would be applicable to a substantial minority, it is unlikely the legal provision would have been enaded to begin with. See Pepper, Taking,
supra note 37, at 313-15; McCo~eu,supra note 5, at 1147-48. Thus the exemption
doctrine is unlikely to substantially undermine the effectiveness of government.
109. See, e.g., Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional Construction and Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1468, 1472-74; Gedicks, supra
note 50, at 106-15 and other sources cited supm note 50.
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and autonomy and a corresponding insufficient recognition of
~ ~ the well
and support for community and c o ~ e c t i o n . 'Given
recognized communal dimension in most religions, the Free
Exercise Clause is the preeminent exception: the value of cornrnunity and connection are given explicit constitutional protection. Only here is communal activity (other than governmental
activity) given constitutional shelter."' The more one is concerned with creating legal and constitutional support for cornmunal life, the more one will be inclined toward an interpretation which gives the Free Exercise Clause power and vitality. '12

F. The Synergism of Text, History, Structure and Policy
Focusing on the speech and press provisions of the First
Amendment, and in doing so finding protection of communicative expression to be the central concept, William Marshall
believes that the equality paradigm provides the proper interpretation for the Free Exercise Clause. Under this view, only
expressive religious conduct is protected from governmental
imposition by the Clause, and only to the same extent it would
be under the speech and press clauses if it had no religious
content or m~tivation."~Professor Marshall has elaborated
arguments against the understanding of each of the factors
presented above, and each of these arguments has some
weight. But the arguments have a distinct ad hoc sense about
them, in that they attack each basis with whatever appears a t
hand-in the nature of a legal brief-rather than cohering
RIGHTSTALK:RIE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PO110. See, e.g., MARYANN GLENDON,
LITICALDISCOURSE
(1991).
111. Federalism, the existence of the states, is the other protection for community in the Constitution. But few would think the states now, or at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, sufficiently small to support the values associated
with community life.
112. Religion is not so singular in regard to its communal dimension as it is in
the ways discussed above, and thus the equality problem is more salient. Other
areas of life-families for example-share a fundamental communal dimension. But
religion is a place to begin, and it has a textual basis in the Constitution.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has felt the need to create constitutional
shelter for aspects of family life even without a textual basis. See, e.g,, Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977) (right to live with extended family); Loving V. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (right to marry); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (liberty to
direct upbringing of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to
pursue a legitimate vocation); TRIBE, supra note 33, at chs. 15-20.
113. Marshall, The Case Against the CompeUed Exemption, supra note 6.
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together.ll4 I do not intend t o address each of these arguments or attempt to rebut each. What I want to point out here
is that such an approach neglects the way in which the factors
developed above interact with and support one another. In a
nutshell, Professor Marshall's argument is that text and history do not make it clear enough that the Free Exercise Clause
was intended to extend to protection from otherwise valid,
religiously neutral laws. When it comes to the area of values/policy/prudence, however, his argument is that religion is
not sufficiently unique; other non-religious bases for action
sometimes share some of the aspects that justify special constitutional treatment for religion. What this view neglects is that
religion is unique in the way i t combines the values/policy/prudence reasons with an explicit textual basis and
substantial, concordant historical and structural reasons.
The text of the First Amendment includes what appears t o
be a clear and near absolute declaration of a zone of liberty for
religious "exercise." That plain reading seems extreme and
difficult to reconcile with notions of government in general and
equality in particular, however, until the structural logic of
such a position is explained. Further, when examined in the
light of both the long- and short-term history preceding the
drafting and adoption of the religion clauses, both the text and
the structural logic which support it make a great deal of
sense. In particular, the perspective of the radical protestants,
their political importance in the evolution of the separation of
church and state in the colonies, and the articulated views of
James Madison, tend to give a distinct coherence to this combination of text, structure and history.l15 What Professor
Marshall's perspective and criticism leave out is this syner114. For example, the argument concerning the. fact that the Free Exercise
Clause is rendered close to content-less by an equality based interpretation is answered by pointing out that the Clause is left with some imaginable meaning; and
that subsequent passage and development of the Equal Protection Clause can hardly determine the original or current meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, at 373-74.
Marshall's argument from history is, essentially, that it is too unclear to be determinative. Id. at 375-79. (McConnell, supra note 22, has provided substantial historical evidence to support exemption doctrine, but Marshall still has a significant
point.) Note that the textual and historical arguments do not join or create momentum for one another; and this is what I mean by ad hoc. The sense is of an
effort to find something wrong or weak with each argument, whatever that might
be.
115. This is similar to what Professor Steven Smith calls the "religious justification" for religious freedom. See Smith, supra note 37, at 154-66.
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gism: those aspects of the factors which support a liberty paradigm, which support exemptions for religious conduct from
neutral law, interact with and support one another i n a way
which makes the whole substantially stronger than the parts.
Professor Marshall notes, for example, that it is not only
religion which gives some persons strong and sometimes adamant bases for action. In addressing the kind of argument
presented in part I1.E. above, he emphasizes that religion is
not "uniq~e.""~(While it is true that other bases of belief
occasiondly can result i n similar depth and emotion, it is probably also true that religion as a category is unique: such
strength and depth and resistance to rational compromise are
associated with religion with far greater frequency than with
any other basis for action. Thus religion is in the aggregate
unique, even if there are numerous cases of similar results in
the absence of a religious basis.) In addition, he points out that
many religious believers do not hold their beliefs with the
strength i d unwillingness to compromise which makes religion arguably unique, and therefore exemptions for all sincere
religious believers from neutral laws would be "overbroad."
That is, some who would get the benefit of the exemptions
would not have the depth or kind of belief which justifies the
exemption."' But this aspect of Professor Marshall's argument leaves out one factor of primary significance: the text.
The First Amendment expressly protects religious conduct; it
does not expressly protect any other bases for conduct.l18
116. Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, at 383
(providing the example of one unavailable for work not because of Sabbath obligations or religious objections to work in an armaments factory, Thomas v. Review
Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (following Sherbert u. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)), but
"due to strong convictions about parental obligations") (footnote omitted).
117. Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, a t 384.
This problem is addressed, in part, in Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at 327-28. In
the end, Professor Marshall admits that while "no one fador" is conclusive, "the
aggregation of a number of fadorsn may mean that religion is unique and therefore "entitled to special protection." Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled
Exemption, supra note 6, at 385-86 (commenting on Garvey, supra note 103).
Professor Marshall appears recently to have come to a firmer conclusion that religion is unique, or at least sufficiently different to require special constitutional and
political treatment. See William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44
HASTINGSL.J. 843 (1993) [hereinafter Marshall, The Other Side of Religion]. His
observations and conclusions there appear quite consistent with the discussion of
religion in part 1I.E.
118. It does expressly protect other, inherently limited, categories of conduct:
speech, press, and assembly for redress of grievances. See supra the beginning
section of part 1I.A. and the concluding two paragraphs of part 1I.C.
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That the reasons for this special protection may not apply t o
each instance of religious conduct, and that other conduct may
occasionally share the special nature of religious motivation,
would not seem to be of great import in light of the express
singling out of religion in the text of the Amendment. (We are
not dealing here with a large and conceptually vague provision
such as "equal protection" or "due process.") Thus Professor
Marshall's argument leaves out the connection, the mutual
support, between the policy and values basis and the explicit
textual support for a special liberty paradigm singling out religion for special treatment.
Once he has left the subjects of text and history, Professor
Marshall's argument tends to forget them. For example, at the
conclusion of one argument11ghe states: "Again, those advocating a free exercise exemption for religious groups must convincingly argue that religious exercise is special."'" Strikingly, the text of the First Amendment, which unequivocally singles out religious "exercise" for unique treatment, is not referred to and appears to have been forgotten, or t o have become
somehow insignificant. The values and policy part of Professor
Marshall's argument thus reads as if the First Amendment had
not yet been written.121 As such, if presented in a textual and
119. Responding to an equality aspect of the liberty paradigm, to be developed
briefly infra at part 1V.A.
120. Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6 , at 380.
121. Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, at 37986. In this section he quotes Professor Mark Tushnet, another participant in this
symposium: "In a pluralistic society with crosscutting group memberships, the overall distribution of benefits and burdens is likely to be reasonably fair." Id. at 380
(quoting Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO.L.J. 1691, 1700 (1988)). This is clearly written as if there were
no Bill of Rights, and asserts no need for one. Interestingly, it is similar to one of
the reasons given by Madison for the proposition that the union of the states
would have a
tendency to break and control the violence of fadion . . . . [Tlhe greater
number of citizens and extent of territory . . . renders factious combinations less to be dreaded . . . . Extend the sphere, and you take in a
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more mcult
for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to a d in unison
with each other.
THE FEDERALIST
N0.10 (James Madison).
Whether or not one agrees with this argument in the context of the communications and politics of the contemporary United States, or with Tushnet's similar
reason, both were clearly rejeded by the adoption of the Bill of Rights as an explicit protection from majority rule in regard to those matters covered by the first
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historical vacuum-that is if we had no Bill of Rights and were
considering what to include in one-it might well present a
persuasive argument that we ought to confine religious freedom
to an ambit identical with freedom of speech only. But we are
not in such a vacuum. The combination and interaction of the
textual, historical, structural and values/policy/prudence foundations for a liberty-based interpretation, which grants shelter
to religious conduct from formally neutral law, is substantially
more powerful than it appears from the perspective of criticism
which considers each basis separately. And in doing constitutional law we seek one interpretation of one set of words which
will function as a guiding rule or principlethe basis for the
development of coherent doctrine. We are not looking for and
separately evaluating a textual, an historical, a structural, and
a policy Constitution. We use all these perspectives as interpretive tools, as alternative angles of vision, to assist in a unified
understanding of a particular legal provision.122

When the Constitution and First Amendment were drafted,
the rational Enlightenment approach to the world was relatively new and still struggling with the theretofore dominant religious understanding. The Constitution is itself a landmark in
the movement toward the dominance of a secular, rational view
of living in the world. In the ensuing two hundred years, secularization has dramatically increased and become clearly dominant in Western intellectual and legal thought.lB With this
ten amendments. Indeed, adoption of such a list of freedoms was an explicit request by several states attendant to (and an implicit condition for) their vote to
ratify. See MILLER,supra note 21, at 119-21.
In an October 17, 1788 letter to Jefferson, Madison claimed that he had "always been in favor of a bill of rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply
powers not meant to be included in the enumeration." He expressed concern, however, that "the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude," specifying in that regard "the rights of conscience in particular." 5 THE
WRITINGS
OF JAMES
MADISON269-75 (This is the famous letter in which Madison
goes on to discuss the "inefficacy of a bill of rights," to refer to them as mere
"parchment barriers," and to discuss the fad that under the Constitution, as opposed to previous governments, "the danger of oppression lies in the interested
majorities of the people rather than in usurped a d s of Government").
122. See supra sources cited at note 8.
123. That secularization has become dominant in these arenas does not mean
that it is necessarily dominant in society generally or in the lives of most individuals, although it may be. Professor Steven Smith provides substantial sociological
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paradigm shift, approaching the religion clauses from the Enlightenment view becomes close to automatic: the protection of
government from the pernicious influence of religion is easy to
grasp, whereas the special protection for religious conduct looks
like unjustifiable discrimination. The Establishment Clause
remains coherent, but it becomes difficult to give content to the
Free Exercise Clause. The threat of religion is perceived more
easily than its promise, and religion becomes marginal.
Similarly, with the transition to the liberal paradigm for
most legal thought, the focus on the individual as the locus of
rights and legal status makes it harder to perceive intermediate groups or community as independent bearers of legal rights
and status. From this direction also the Enlightenment view of
the Establishment Clause as a primary protection for the government (and indirectly for individuals) comes t o predominate
over a view concerned with and protective of religious communities-the latter a view more consistent with the republican
tradition.
We are thus far removed from the framers' context in
which strong constitutional protection for religion, including
religious communities, made intuitive sense. It is no great
surprise, therefore, that until Sherbert and Yoder the Free
Exercise Clause was reduced to the other First Amendment
freedoms, in effect given no independent content.'* For these
same reasons, it is also unsurprising that the Court found it
diflkult to consistently apply the doctrine announced in those
cases, and has now returned to a view which provides religious
freedom little or no special protection.
Contemporary interpretation and application of the Free
Exercise Clause thus faces a choice. One can read the clauses
from Jefferson's perspective, an Enlightenment view that sees
religion primarily as threat. Or one can turn to Madison (a
different Enlightenment view) and to the radical protestants,
data suggesting that religion is a live force in most American lives. He appears to
grant the dominance of the secular view in political, intellectual, and legal thought,
but prefers to refer to this as the privatization of religion rather than the secularization of these arenas. Smith, supra note 37, at 169-80. Otherwise, the view of
the Free Exercise Clause presented there and that argued here are, for the most
part, consistent and compatible.
124. Tushnet, supra note 51, at 729-38. I remain uncomfortable with the ambiguity of the usage "liberal" in this context, but will employ it nonetheless. In the
more generic usage of riberal," I am not sure it can be identified more with an
individualistic than a comrnunitarian approach to law.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 56-65.

.
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and see religion a s both a threat and a promise.126 The Jeffersonian view leads to a strong Establishment Clause, and to a
Free Exercise Clause with no contemporary effect. Religious
conduct is protected if it falls within the protections of the
speech, press, or association provisions of the First Amendment, but not otherwise.12' The Madisonian and radical protestant views lead to a strong Free Exercise Clause while not
denigrating from a strong Establishment Clause. The absolute
text of the Free Exercise Clause is hard to reconcile with the
restrictive view, as is much of the historical context. An understanding of the Free Exercise Clause under which it has vigor
and effect, on the other hand, fits well with both text and historical context. It also makes sense from several perspectives
on the structure and theory of the Constitution in general and
the First Amendment in particular. The values, policies and
prudence suggested by the text, its history, and a significant
part of the theory and structure of the C o n s t i t ~ t i o n 'also
~~
point in this direction.
Choosing to take the text seriously, choosing to interpret
the Free Exercise Clause as granting substantial protection for
religious conduct from governmental regulation, is only a first
step. Such an orientation turns religion clause jurisprudence
down a road which requires a great deal of doctrinal development. A freedom of such large scope cannot be absolute, yet the
clause is phrased without limit. Neither history nor structure
provides clear limit or gloss. The construction of limits is a
daunting task and may explain, a t least in part, the Supreme
Court's delay in taking the initial step and its apparent inconsistency in application of the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine. And it is
the primary reason presented in the Smith opinion for undoing
that d 0 ~ t r i n e . l ~ ~
Charting the contours that a vigorous but workable free
126. See supra parts IIA. & B.
127. See Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6;
Marshall, Free Exercise as Free Expression, supra note 6.
128. It cannot be denied that si-cant
theoretical and structural aspects of the
Constitution support the Jeffersonian approach. As mentioned supra, text accompanying note 56, the First Amendment can be read as a unit protecting fundamentally communicative activity only (including religious speech, press and possibly
worship to the extent it includes symbolic speech, but no other kinds of religious
activity). Also, as mentioned in part II.E.,the emphasis of our constitutional tradition on equality does not square well, on Grst thought, with a constitutional protection for religious conduct that extends to no other kind of conduct.
129. 494 U.S.at 882-90.
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exercise doctrine might take is a necessary task for constitutional interpretation. It is a larger task than I am willing to
undertake in this article.1s0 To give a sense of the scope and
viability of the task, however, a few of the more prominent
difficulties that must be faced in the application of a robust
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause are discussed briefly
below.

IV. A QUARTET
OF DIFFICULTIES
A. The Establishment Clause, Equality,
and Exemptions fiom Neutral Law
The presence of the Establishment Clause complicates free
exercise doctrine, and the Free Exercise Clause likewise complicates Establishment Clause doctrine. As noted above, the
First Amendment singles religion out for both a special detriment and a special benefit. If the Establishment Clause prohibits all legal preferences for religion, the Free Exercise Clause is
itself a violation. Likewise, if the Free Exercise Clause prohibits all government detriments to religion, the Establishment
Clause is itself a ~ i o l a t i o n . 'In
~ ~a n age of ubiquitous governmental regulation and subsidy, this has become a serious complication for First Amendment analysis. Either clause can be
interpreted so expansively as to leave little content for the
other. And whatever interpretation is given one clause, a compatible interpretation can be given the other.
There are a number of ways of approaching this tension
between the clauses. Any resolution must also face the connected question of what space will be left between the clauses for
discretionary governmental action neither compelled by the
Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment
Clause.ls2 These approaches will not be canvassed here. I will
pause, however, for a brief focus on exemptions and establishment. Granting believers exemptions from neutral legal regula-

130.
Some of my earlier work has made some suggestions in this area. See, e.g.,
Pepper, Taking, supm note 37, at 325-36; Pepper, Conundrum, supra note 3. See
also J. Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV.
L. REV.327
(1969); Marc Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning Point?
1966 WIS.
L. REV. 217.
131. Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling
the Conflict, 41 U. Prm. L. REV. 673 (1980); Pepper, Altemtives, supm note 3, at
345-52.
132. McConnell, supra note 50.
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tions that apply t o others is a benefit for religion based upon
an explicitly religious criterion, and thus can be seen as a violation of the Establishment Clause. (This is the route one takes
t o find an equality paradigm to be the appropriate reading of
the Free Exercise Clause.) But there is nothing to distinguish
that conclusion from one which reads the entire Free Exercise
Clause out of the Constitution, for that Clause also is a benefit
for religion based upon an explicit textual religious criterion:
"free exercise of religion." There is a structural understanding
of the clauses, however, with which exemptions are perfectly
congruent; and this understanding is perfectly congruent with
the Free Exercise Clause as a guaranty of substantive rather
than merely formal equality.
Assume for the moment that the absolute language of the
Free Exercise Clause is premised on the Madisonian notion,
sketched above,'= that there is no consent t o be governed in
regard to matters of religion, and that the clause is the "social
contract" t o that effect incorporated into the Constitution. This
is perfectly in tune with the understanding of the Bill of Rights
as a charter protecting the minority from the majority. When
combined with an effective Establishment Clause, minority and
majority will be in the same position in regard to the nexus
between religious practice and government action. The clauses
together prevent the majority from purposefully using government to favor itself or disfavor minorities in religious matters
(in other words, separation of church and state). But the majority is also unlikely to unintentionally impinge on its own religious beliefs (with which it is quite familiar), whereas it is
quite likely to do so in the case of small religious minorities.
Consider for a moment, would states require photos on driver's
licenses if Jewish or Catholic religious beliefs prohibited use of
photographs?ls4
To truly equalize minority and majority (or a coalition of
minorities) in regard t o the relations between religion and
government, the clauses must therefore protect against not
only intentional discrimination on religious matters, but also
the inadvertent. Thus the need for, and constitutional logic of,
exemptions for believers from neutral governmental actions
-

133.
See supra part 1I.C.
134.
See Pepper, Conundrum, supra note 3, at 296-99 & 11.159; Pepper, Taking,
supm note 37, at 312-16; Laycock, supra note 5, at 14-15; McConnell, supm note
5; at 1147-49.
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that remain valid as to others.135And this constitutional logic
and structure leave the Establishment Clause intact and with a
strong independent role of its own. In fact it leaves essentially
all of the Court's current Establishment Clause doctrine intact. ls6
The inadvertence of the government's religious discrimination, and the equalization of majority and minority, lead us to
the question of perspective: the government's conduct is innocent and nondiscriminatory in plan and intent; but in effect it
is oppressive to the minority. If we are interpreting a document, such as the Bill of Rights, designed to protect minority
from majority, the question of which perspective is appropriate
would seem easy to answer. Moreover, the text, history, structure and values implicated in interpretation of the clauses,
discussed above, all point toward this perspective as well. Thus
substantive equality-a reading of the religion clauses which
leaves both politically dominant and politically weak religious
groups equal in their inability to use the government (law) to
assist their own religion or burden others-makes the most
sense as an interpretation of the Bill of Rights, a document
designed to protect minorities and individuals from democracy
(the majority or a coalition of minorities).ls7
one other, related equality concern ought to be mentioned
here. Seeing in the First Amendment primarily a protection for
speech, Professor Marshall suggests that a liberty paradigm for
religion gives it an improper advantage in the marketplace of
ideas that is inconsistent with his understanding of the free

135. Galanter, supra note 130, at 291; Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at 312-15;
Comment, A Non-Conflict Approach to the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 131
U. PA. L. REV. 1175, 1197-208 (1983).
136. It should probably be mentioned, as well, that the view articulated in this
paper which leads to a vigorous, powerful Free Exercise Clause can also lead to a
similarly effective Establishment Clause. Personally, while I believe Establishment
Clause doctrine leaves a great deal to be desired, P am not convinced that very
many of the Supreme Court's cases have been wrongly decided. And most of those
that I believe are wrong, such as Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US. 668 (1984) (the
nativity scene case), and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1982) (tax deductions for
parents for some parochial school expenses), err on the side of failing to find an
establishment violation where one has occurred.
137. Justice Souter's significant concurring opinion this term in the Hialeah case,
see text accompanying note 97, identifies the Smith decision with formal neutrality
and the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine with substantive neutrality, bringing that terminology into the free exercise opinions of the Court for the first time, and arguing the
latter as the correct interpretation of the free exercise clause. 113 S. Ct. at 224042.
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speech provisions of the Amendment.ls8 From this perspective, if protection for religious communication is greater than
for other communication, religion is given a n advantage over
other bases for conduct in the free competition of ideas. This
difficulty is easily remedied, however, if the First Amendment
is read as providing religious communication (speech and press)
the same degree of protection as other core areas of protected
expression. To the extent religious conduct is only communication (speech or press) otherwise covered by the Amendment,
there appears to be an overlap of protection, and no need or
reason to provide extra protection for religious speech over
political speech. Only when the religious conduct is not primarily communicative (and thus would not be protected under the
speech and press clauses) is there need or reason for a Free
Exercise Clause. (And thus, of course, the significance of a
clause that uses a word-"exercise"-which
so clearly denotes
conduct of all kinds, conduct beyond the scope of communication, conduct which is neither speech nor press.)
Polygamy, ingestion of peyote, refusal to carry a picture or
to send one's children to school, all may have communicative or
symbolic elements; but they are not primarily speech, and
would not fall under the current interpretations of the scope of
the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment. When
the conduct is primarily communicative, however, there is no
need to discriminate between religious and non-religious conduct. I n Widmar u. Vincent,13' the Supreme Court held that
because the University of Missouri had created a n open forum
for student speech on campus, it could not discriminate against
religious speech (interpreting a worship service by students to
be speech). In doing so, it held that the Free Speech Clause
(and equal treatment under the open forum doctrine), rather
than the Establishment, Free Exercise, or Equal Protection
Clauses, was the appropriate standard. Such a view directly
meets Professor Marshall's concerns in the area of speech, and
is the prevailing view on the C o ~ r t . " ~(And even if it were
not, it must be remembered that there is no Establishment
138. Marshall, The Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, at 38894.
139. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
140. In addition to Widmar, see Heffkon v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981); cf. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1
(1989). The Court has left this somewhat less clear than it was before through
dicta in the Smith case. See Laycock, supra note 5, at 44-47.
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Clause for speech. Thus government is not prohibited from
favoritism in regard to ideas and bases for conduct in its own
speech. Public schools are free to teach that capitalism is better
than communism, respect and concern for the environment
better than despoliation, and they commonly do so. There is no
requirement that the government be neutral or treat all ideas
equally in its own c~mmunication.)'~~
A First Amendment doctrine which treats religious communication equally with other communication is not enough from
Professor Marshall's view, however, because the Free Exercise
Clause can still be read to give preferential treatment to religious conduct beyond speech, and this violates his understanding of the First Amendment in its entirety as an "equality of
There is some validity t o this concern,
ideas" pro~ision.'~~
some real unfairness in giving advantage t o those who act from
religious motivation. (Although, as pointed out a t the beginning
of this article, that unfairness varies greatly depending upon
the context in which the claim arises.) But it must be noted
that this is not an unfairness in giving a preference where the
Constitution is concerned with the marketplace of ideas: the
speech and press clauses. And it must be emphasized that there
is no "equality of ideas" clause in the Bill of Rights, while there
is an explicit Free Exercise Clause. Moreover, the government
favors some ideas and disfavors others in all its vast criminal
and civil regulation of conduct. It criminalizes theft; it encourages charitable contributions (and defines what counts as charitable).143When Professor Marshall moves his argument from
speech to conduct, it conflicts directly with the ubiquitous governmental regulation of conduct in this society. In respect to
religion, government merely does so at a more fundamental
level of legal preference, by including freedom of religion in its
basic charter of rights.

B. Drawing Lines, Neutrality and Discrimination
Applying the Free Exercise Clause under the SherbertYoder doctrine requires that lines be drawn and discriminations be made. The sincere must be distinguished from the
141. See generally MARK G. YUDOF,WHENGOVERNMENT
SPEAKS
(1983).
142. Marshall, m e Case Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, at 39294. This view resonates with the structural unity of the First Amendment articulated in the text accompanying note 49.
143. Cf. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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fraudulent. (For example, someone who objects to mandatory
education for non-religious reasons may be tempted to claim
the religious exemption granted the Amish.) Instances where
religious claimants cannot be exempted from government regulations because of the extent of damage resulting to important
government concerns must be distinguished from situations
where the exemption inflicts tolerable damage to the governmental interest. (For example, a person who asserted religious
objection to carrying any driver's license or alternative official
identification would present a difficult judgment even under a
vigorous free exercise interpretation; a situation far more problematic than presented by Mrs. Quaring.'") When such distinctions are drawn there is a lack of equality not just between
those with a religious basis for exemption and those without,
but also amongst those asserting religious claims.
Some justices of the Supreme Court have been unwilling to
adopt a doctrine under which such lines must be drawn, perceiving that the basic command of the religion clauses is neutrality: that government not discriminate between religions.
But if the Free Exercise Clause is to have modern content, such
lines must be drawn. If sincerity cannot be considered, or if no
interest of the government justifies impingement on religion,
we are close to a n absolute freedom. Little if any content will
be given to such a n unlimited freedom. Thus, on the claim of
avoiding the danger of the kinds of religious discrimination the
clauses were designed to prevent, these justices end up granting essentially no meaningful protection for religious conduct
other than against overt religiously discriminatory government
action.145 To protect those claimants who might lose because
Automobiles are dangerous instrumentalities; unrestricted use by unidentifiable persons may create too much risk to tolerate, too complete a preference for
religion, particularly in light of the non-consenting third parties who may be
harmed. On the other hand, it might be that "less drastic means" could be created
by a sufficiently flexible government even for this situation. Those who had a genuine religious need not to carry a license (sincerity would be an important dimension of such a case) might register with the state, provide identifying information,
and sign a waiver granting, in any situation in which a driver's license is normally
required by law enforcement personnel, permission for detention until identification
could otherwise be confirmed. This would certainly be a signiFicant administrative
burden on the state, but because the number of people claiming the exemption is
likely to be very small, the occasions for detention would likely be extremely rare.
(Such a waiver would have the incidental effect of helping to test the sincerity of
the religious claim.)
145. For a more extended discussion of the sincerity issue and of the positions
of Justices White and Stevens, see Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at 325-31.
144.
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they are incorrectly found to be insincere, or the government
interest is found too important, all religious exemptions must
fall. To protect the feelings of that subgroup of religious claimants, all persons whose religious conduct is harmed by neutral
government action must suffer.'" (One is reminded of destroying the village to save it.)
This is simply another facet of the Enlightenment-oriented
approach which, seeing religion primarily as threat rather than
promise, elevates the Establishment Clause protection of the
government from religion over the Free Exercise Clause protection of religion from g~vernment.'~'Meaningful contemporary
religious liberty under the Free Exercise Clause entails difficult
choices in the course of application; and this is certainly a significant cost. Sometimes such line drawing will be painful,
sometimes it will seem unjust, and sometimes it will be erroneous. The alternative neutrality view may avoid these costs, but
it must be remembered that it does so at the probably greater
cost of reading out of the Constitution one of its most explicit
and fundamental rights. '48
146. Douglas Laycock characterizes this view as a preference for "even-handed
repression" over "imperfect liberty." Laycock, supra note 5, at 14.
147. The Establishment Clause retains vigor under the neutrality view. Government cannot discriminate among religions in the granting of assistance or benefits,
and it cannot discriminate in favor of religion generally by granting it benefits or
assistance other similar activities or institutions do not receive. Of course this
creates one major discrimination: the constitutional provision discriminating against
religion retains vigor and effect; the provision discriminating in favor of religion
does not.
Professor Kurland has been the foremost academic proponent of the "neutrality"
approach, proposing that the clauses be read as a limitation "akin to . . . the
Equal Protection Clause," prohibiting use of religious classifications "for purposes of
governmental action, whether that action be the conferring of rights or privileges
RELIGION
AND THE
or the imposition of duties or obligations." PHILIP B. KURLAND,
LAW 17-18 (1962) discussed in Pepper, Alternatives, supra note 3, at 346-48.
148. It is far too easy to forget, or not t o notice, the simple fact that the "neutrality" approach is hardly neutral or equal in impact. Laws which impinge on
religious conscience inflict an injury of a quite different kind on the believer than
the inconvenience or general constraint on liberty that same law inflicts on one
whose religion is not affeded. Thus neutrality and equality may lie in the eye of
the beholder, and may depend on whether one looks at the face of a legal provision or at the effect on the claimant. For a discussion of similar issues concerning
the importance of perspective, see Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
Justice Souter makes a similar point in his concurrence this term in the
Hialeah case. There he states: "Our cases make clear, to look at this from a different perspective, that an exemption for sacramental wine use would not deprive
Prohibition of neutrality. Rather, 'such an accommodation [would] 'reflect nothing
more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differ-
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C. Administrability and Bureaucracy
Judicial opinions are opaque, particularly to non-lawyers.
Case law decides a dispute retrospectively based upon a comparison of the facts in the disputed situation with the facts in
the precedent cases. It applies by analogy; it is law reached by
deciding which facts were the relevant ones leading to the
decision in the prior opinion, because rarely are the facts in a
subsequent situation substantially the same as those in the
precedent case. Such law is dissimilar from legislation or regulation because those are usually formulated as discrete rules;
rules which, on their face at least, are more precise and delimited. Free exercise jurisprudence is exemplary of this problem.
The Free Exercise Clause is not a precise or delimited rule
which on its face can guide the action of governmental actors.
The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine was complex and subtle, requiring
simultaneous application of a number of factors and perceptions; it exhibited and demanded flexibility in its application.
And any doctrine sacient to create a vigorous but workable
body of free exercise law will be similar, even if it is different
from Sherbert-Yoder in significant ways. Judicial opinions applying and creating free exercise law are unlikely to be simple
or easy to understand.
This creates a real danger that the law as applied on a
day-to-day basis by non-lawyer government actors will be quite
different from the law as it would be decided by the courts.
Bureaucracies, through which most government activities occur, are particularly unlikely to be flexible, subtle or complex in
their understanding and application of free exercise doctrine.
Uniformity and rules-lack of discretion-are their preferred
mode of operation. Overgeneralization from a judicial decision,
or series of decisions, is thus a real possibility. A contemporary
example from Establishment Clause doctrine is instructive: the
recent cleansing from public school texts of references to and
discussions of religious subjects149appears to have occurred,
at least in signi.fkant part, because of a misunderstanding and
overextension of Establishment Clause requirements by school
boards, school administrators, text book committees and text
ences.' ' " 113 S. Ct. at 2241 n.2 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235 n.22, quoting
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409).
149. Paul C. Vitz, Religion and Traditional Values in Public School Textbooks,
84 PUB. INTEREST 79 (1986); Dent, supra note 73.
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book publishers.150 This happened despite repeated and explicit dicta by the Supreme Court that it was not required by
their decisions-repeated statements that studying religion or
religious material in the context of a secular subject like history or literature was acceptable and that it was religious practice (such as prayer) or indoctrination that was unconstitutiona1.151
The extent of this problem varies greatly with different
factual contexts. For example, the bureaucrats who administer
driver's licenses are likely to be able to differentiate between
someone in Mrs. Quaring's position and the claimant hypothesized above whose religious beliefs prohibit use of any driver's
license a t all or any formal substitute. And in the Bob Jones
situation, IRS agents are more likely to have the training (and
the skepticism) to apply a pro free exercise decision in a flexible and subtle way than are other bureaucrat^.'^^ Given the
subtleties and charged feelings in the school situation, school
officials, as the Establishment Clause example suggests, may
be more likely to misunderstand and overgeneralize.
In Mozert u. Hawkins County Public Schools,153fundamentalist parents claimed that imposition of a particular basic
reading series in public school was a violation of their free
150. The causes of this phenomenon are probably complex, and would be an
important subject for empirical research. Mixed with misunderstanding of Supreme
Court doctrine may well be (1) a preference to avoid even coming near the constitutional line, (2) a preference for a n excuse to avoid the sensitive and controversial
questions of religion in public education, and (3) a bias that religion is appropriate
in the private realm and inappropriate in the public realm. This, of course, would
be in accord with the Enlightenment view of religion and with the dominant modern secular intellectual paradigm. See Dent, supra note 73, at 867-73; Pepper,
Takings, supra note 37, at 306-07. For an argument that religion is inappropriate
in the public realm, see Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, supra note 117,
which contains references to some of the current writing on that question.
151. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968); Abington Township
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
US. 203, 235-36 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
152. This may be over-optimistic given the IRS' initially slow and ineffective
response to the Universal Life Church claims of tax exemption for their "churches."
See Universal Life Church v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Cal. 1974);
Note, Mail Order Ministries, the Religious Purpose Exemption, and the Constitution,
33 TAX LAW. 959 (1979-80); Stephen Schwartz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions:
When Should the Church Render unto Caesar, 29 FLA. L. REV. 50, 62 m.81 & 82
(1976); see also Heins, "Other People's Faiths": The Scientology Litigation and the
Justiciability of Religious Fraud, 9 HASTINGS
CONST.L.Q. 153 (1981).
153.
647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D.Tenn. 1986), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
The facts, the two opinions, and the basic issues the case raised are explored in
detail in Stolzenberg, supra note 49, at 581.
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exercise rights because of the content of many of the readings.
The federal district court in a careful and nuanced application
of the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine agreed, and ordered that the
students be exempted from reading class and allowed to receive
home instruction in reading. The judge was well aware of the
potential for overgeneralization:
While the Court must be sensitive to the widespread
implications of its decisions, it must also limit its decisions to
the facts of the case before it . . . .
This opinion shall not be interpreted to require the
school system to make this option available to any other person or to these plaintiffs for any other subject. Further accommodations, if they must be made, will have to be made on a
case-by-case basis by the teachers, school administrators,
Board, and Department of Education . . . .I5'

The court's attempt at care notwithstanding, this would seem
to be exactly the kind of widely publicized decision likely t o be
misunderstood and overgeneralized by administrators, bureaucrats, elected public officials (such as school board members)
and parents, most of whom are far more likely t o hear of and
be influenced by the decision than to have read the opinion.
The defendants and many commentators in the media were
concerned that such a decision would cause crippling administrative problems for many public schools. As written it probably
would not have; but as misunderstood by a large segment of
relevant actors, as it might well have been, it could have led to
significant problems of over-application.
This is a genuine concern for courts elaborating free exercise doctrine, and may explain some of the inconsistency in
application of the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine.ls5 It is the kind of
concern that might underlie a preference for the neutrality
approach discussed in the section above, for avoiding distinctions in application makes the doctrine much simpler. Sherbert
was the law for over twenty-five years, however, and I know of
647 F. Supp. at 1202-03.
154.
155. In United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), for example, the Court's apparent failure to follow the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine may have stemmed from concern that an opinion dealing with the narrow situation of the Amish and social
security tax might be misunderstood as applying to taxes in general, including
income taxes. The opinion may also be based on the related concern that religion
based exemptions from taxation are more likely to create sincerity and fraud problems than are exemptions from other governmental regulations. For a discussion of
Lee, see Pepper, Conundrum, supm note 3, at 299-302.
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no serious problems that have been caused by overgeneralization in app1i~ation.l~~
It is possible, of course, that such effects have occurred, because I also know of no studies of the
effect of modern free exercise doctrine on decisions outside the
courts. Because a doctrine providing for robust exemptions
under the Free Exercise Clause goes against the grain of the
d o m i n a n t s e c u l a r i n t e l l e c t u a l p a r a d i g m , however,
overgeneralization may be much less of a threat here than it
was with application of the Establishment Clause to the public
schools, where the doctrine tended to go with the grain rather
than against it.15'

D. Timidity, Limits and Possibility
Even during the Sherbert-Yoder era, the decisions of the
Supreme Court in favor of religious exemptions concerned, for
the most part, matters not of major significance from the
government's point of view. A few more persons qualifying for
unemployment insurance,'" or accommodating a few welfare
recipients who refuse to use a social security number,'" are
~~
of course, is the
hardly issues of general i m p ~ r t a n c e . 'Yoder,
clear exception given the importance of education. But even in
that case the consequences were distinctly circumscribed by the
insular, limited nature of the Amish community and way of
life. And the Court went out of its way-to a n almost bizarre
e x t e n t t o clearly indicate that the holding was limited to the
circumstances of the Ami~h.'~'Had the case been likely to
have more generalized consequences for mandatory public education systems, it is unlikely it would have been decided as it
156. At least in the courts, quite the contrary was the case. Plaintiffs asserting
freedom of religion claims tended to lose. James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407
(1992);see also Pepper, Conundrum, supra note 3.
157. See supra note 150.
158. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 US. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Compensation Appeals
Comm'n, 480 US. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707 (1981).
159. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
160. That they are not issues of major consequence does not mean that they are
not of great importance to the individuals involved, or that how the state treats
such individuals is not itself of major importance. Here I am addressing the consequences, from the state's point of view, of accommodating these individuals in the
particular contexts in which the Court has held it was rewired by the Free Exercise Clause.
161. Pepper, Alternatives, supra note 3, at 333-45.
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was.l'j2
Thus, even under the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine, protection
for religion has been held required only in areas of marginal
concern to the state. The lower courts have ranged significantly
further than the Supreme Court, as the Mozert trial court opinion shows, but timidity is present in those courts as well, as
exemplified by the circuit court's overturning of that very decision? In this area there seems to be a distinct disinclination
on the part of the courts to constrain government in any way
that has major consequences. The timidity may be due in part
to concern that the freedom has no limits (as the language in
the Clause has no limits), a concern that giving the Clause real
power may start the law down a slippery slope. I have suggested elsewhere several limits to constrain the freedom within
manageable bounds, limits which would make incursions into
significant governmental interests quite modest, yet yield substantial areas of freedom from government imposition for religiously motivated c ~ n d u c t . ' ~A coherent, limited doctrine
which gives real power to the Free Exercise Clause can be
constructed without undue difficulty. It will not be easy to
apply-painful
and problematic choices will have to be
made-but it can be created with relatively minor additions to
and modifications of the basic ideas underlying Sherbert and
Yoder.
Instead of focusing on relatively narrow limits, however,
consider for a moment what would happen if the courts were
less timid, if the limits were more capacious. If Bob Jones University had maintained its tax exemption, would a great deal in
our society change? There might be some incentive for fraudulent claims of religious belief to give shelter for racial discrimination in education, but both the IRS and our courts are sufficiently competent at sifting truth from falsehood that no large
social change or damage is likely to ensue. More difficult is the
Reynolds case. Could our society tolerate-make room for-a
group with a significantly different understanding of the nature
of something so fundamental as marriage? What would the
consequences have been of islands of polygamy within a general rule of law mandating monogamy? Would the legal require-

162. Pepper, Altemtiues, supra note 3, at 344.
163. Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Sch., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). Several lower court decisions are examined in Pepper, Conundrum, supm note 3, at 265.
164.
See Pepper, Taking, supra note 37, at 325-35
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ment of monogamy tend to change because of the demands of
equality? Would the social fabric change in any important way?
Would the non-legal forces toward conformity have led the
Mormon church to repudiate polygamy in any case?
What would be the consequences of a constitutional rule
that shelters some fundamentally different ways of living? This
stretches the imagination. The direction it moves one's thought
is interesting: perhaps a society more genuinely diverse than
ours; perhaps a tolerance level of a different order; perhaps
pluralism in things that matter; perhaps space created in the
interstices of the bureaucratic state for communities and communal values to come into being and grow.lB5And perhaps
there are rather darker possibilities to imagine as well.lB6
To return to the question of equality: would it be fair, assuming such a leavening could occur in our legal regime, for
the space to be available only to those with religious motivation, only to those who form religious communities? The interpretation and arguments elaborated above suggest that the
answer is clearly "yes." If you are inclined toward a %o" answer, however, at least two thoughts should be considered.
First, the good of such an open, diverse polity may be worth the
cost of that unfairness. And, second, this strong equality inclination (which is what the perception of unfairness must be
based upon) may have a sort of hydraulic effect: granting significant liberty for religion might over time initiate a dynamic
leading t o the creation of other areas of constitutional liberty.
The definition of religion might enlarge over time to create
such liberty;16' or other parts of the Constitution might be

165. In this regard it is interesting to note that in the last decade two of the
"Forewords" to the Harvard Law Review's annual Supreme Court issue have been
based on Free Exercise Clause cases, but have been concerned with far broader
matters. See Cover, supra note 41; Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986). Each seems to have been imagining a
legal regime with more room for difference, with significant legal space for community. Imagining a Free Exercise Clause taken seriously leads in this direction.
166. See Stephen Pepper, The Case of the Human Sacrifice, 23 ARIZ. L. REV.
897 (1981), for some imagining along these lines testing the outer limits of freedom
of religion. See also Stanley Hauerwas, Self-Sacrifwe as Demonic: A Theological
AND RELIGIOUS
COMMITMENT:
IMPLICATIONS
OF
Response to Jonestown, in VIOLENCE
JIMJONES'S
PEOPLE'STEMPLEMOVEMENT
(Ken Levi ed., 1982), for a discussion of
the Jim Jones tragedy. The recent debacle involving the Branch Davidians in
Waco, Texas, is another reminder of the violent possibilities involved in religious
freedom.
167. William Marshall argues that my earlier expression of such a possibility
means that he and I essentially agree on the equality view. Marshall, The Case
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their source, as has occurred with the substantive due process
rights of "privacy."168

Two hundred years ago religion was recognized as a legitimate source of non-governmental authority; it was a rival to
the state. The religion clauses recognize that fact. Now, quite
far removed from that recognition, do we reduce religion to all
other human motivations, generally subordinate to law and
government? Or do we take the Constitution's guaranty of
religious freedom seriously, interpreting the First Amendment
to shelter significant areas of conduct, perhaps hoping that
such protection might over time generalize t o other related, but
non-religious, motivations? Do we interpret the Constitution to
expand or contract individual liberty and intermediate community power? Text, history, structure, prudence and precedent all
support a vigorous understanding of freedom of religion. There
are risks and difficulties with the interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause suggested here, but the promise appears greater than the threat.

Against the Compelled Exemption, supra note 6, at 402-03, commenting on Pepper,
Taking, supra note 37, at 331-32. I believe this is incorrect. In the absence of the
development of an expanded definition of religion, it is clear to me that the Free
Exercise Clause ought to be interpreted to shelter religious conduct as traditionally
understood. This includes the peyote usage in Smith, the polygamy in ReywZds
(depending upon the outcome of something like the Sherbert-Yoder "compelling
interest" test), and the parents' claim in Yoder, situations where I believe Marshall
would not now find the Free Exercise Clause providing shelter. For me, the expansion of the definition of religion is quite secondary to the issue of reading the Free
Exercise Clause as shelter from otherwise valid law. For Marshall, the definitional
issue would be primary, the expansion would have to occur ,before he would read
the Clause as providing protection for conduct beyond speech. See Marshall, Free
Exercise as Free Expression, supra note 6, a t 587-88 & n.214. For discussions of
defining religion under the First Amendment see Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. IU.L. REV. 579; Kent Greenawalt, Religion
as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753 (1984); Pepper, AZtemtives, supra note 3, at 353-64, and sources cited in those articles.
168. See TRIBE, supra note 33, at ch. 15.

